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DANGEROUS WARRANTS 
Nirej Sekhon* 
Abstract: The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold 
standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a “warrant preference” on the 
premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures 
encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference 
with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most 
outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article 
terms “non-compliance warrants”: summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with 
a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor 
offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson, 
Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this, 
warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance 
warrants as if they are no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant preference. 
This Article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and 
otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct 
unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement 
also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests 
beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal 
justice. The Article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter 
unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the Article identifies steps state and local 
courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With guns drawn, 150 police officers stormed the dilapidated 
apartment building—nearly one officer for every unit.1 The Detroit Police 
Department called the operation “Clean Sweep.” Officers would trawl the 
building for individuals wanted on outstanding warrants. The police 
department suggested that wanted felons were responsible for much of the 
crime in the building.2 Officers went door to door, putting residents on 
edge, but ultimately netted thirty warrant dodgers.3 The department 
declared the operation a success. It failed to mention that virtually none 
of the arrestees was a wanted felon. More than two-thirds of the arrests 
were based on warrants for failures to appear in traffic court; most of the 
remaining one-third also stemmed from relatively minor misconduct.4 
Were Clean Sweep’s shock and awe tactics necessary or even intended to 
reduce crime? Because arrest warrants for unpaid traffic tickets and other 
minor misdeeds are voluminous and far outnumber those for serious 
felonies, the police might have guessed that Clean Sweep would net more 
bad drivers than actual outlaws. It is possible that the police did know but 
were indifferent so long as the highly publicized raid generated a parade 
of arrestees for the press waiting outside the building. 
The sheer number of outstanding warrants enables aggressive police 
enforcement tactics of which Clean Sweep is just one example.5 Such 
tactics are fraught with constitutional dangers, as is the judicial practice 
of summarily issuing arrest warrants based on trifling misconduct, some 
of which is not criminal at all. This Article describes both sets of practices 
and the constitutional harms that flow from them. Contrary to courts’ and 
commentators’ beliefs, warrants may amplify police discretion rather than 
constrain it. 
                                                     
1. Ryan Felton, Operation: Restore Public Relations, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/operation-restore-public-relations/Content?oid=2334953 
[http://perma.cc/E2UR-Q34Y]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See infra section II.A.  
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For generations, the Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the 
Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police. The Court has 
touted a “warrant preference,” stating that a search or seizure conducted 
without a warrant is per se unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional.6 This 
reflects the Court’s view that Fourth Amendment rights are better 
protected when police enforcement choices are subject to judicial review 
before execution.7 The warrant preference requires that a “neutral and 
detached magistrate” vigorously review police warrant applications.8 In 
theory, this should entail a thorough questioning of witnesses’ credibility 
and evaluation of whether the police’s factual showing satisfies “probable 
cause,” the standard specified by the Fourth Amendment.9 I call this vision 
of courts’ role in screening warrant applications the “magisterial ideal.” 
Critics have long charged that, in practice, judges do not live up to the 
magisterial ideal because warrant hearings are ex parte and cursory.10 
Warrant applications are “rubber stamped” with far less scrutiny than the 
magisterial ideal presupposes.11 Both the magisterial ideal and criticism 
of it assume that warrants are supposed to constrain police discretion. 
Both perspectives share the same blind spot. Both focus only on one type 
of warrant, the “investigatory warrant”—where police seek judicial 
permission to gather evidence or make arrests in order to advance a 
specific criminal investigation.12 As suggested by operation Clean Sweep, 
however, the majority of outstanding warrants are not of the investigatory 
variety at all. 
The most common outstanding warrants in the United States are what 
I call “non-compliance warrants.”13 These warrants are not intended to 
constrain police discretion but rather to secure a defendant’s submission. 
Because of their sheer numbers, non-compliance warrants affirmatively 
generate, rather than constrain, police discretion. This contravenes the 
warrant preference’s spirit by creating powerful incentives for the police 
                                                     
6. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
7. See id. 
8. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
10. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 
1639–40 (2012) (summarizing critical literature). 
11. See id. 
12. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14. 
13. See infra section II.A.  
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to unconstitutionally seize individuals to conduct warrant checks. Non-
compliance warrants also play a central but unrecognized role in 
perpetuating race and class disparities in our criminal justice system. 
Non-compliance warrants are issued for failing to comply with court or 
executive orders—for example, failing to appear for a court date, failing 
to comply with a probation condition, or failing to pay a traffic fine.14 
They do not require a police application and usually take the form of a 
bench warrant issued summarily by a judge, court clerk, or probation 
official.15 Contrary to the magisterial ideal, judges and police are not 
counter-positioned when non-compliance warrants are issued.16 Rather, 
court and police interests are aligned, with the former calling upon the 
latter to secure the named person.17 Courts are profligate in issuing non-
compliance warrants, particularly for relatively minor misconduct, much 
of which is not criminal.18 The Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) 2014 
investigation of Ferguson, Missouri highlights another example of why 
these warrants are dangerous.19 
In 2013 alone, the municipal court in Ferguson issued enough non-
compliance warrants to account for nearly half the city’s population.20 The 
vast majority of these warrants were for failing to appear (FTAs) for 
municipal code and traffic violations.21 The DOJ observed that Ferguson 
imposed exceptionally high fines for municipal code violations and used 
its criminal justice apparatus as a punitive collection agency.22 The city 
directed courts and police to maximize the revenue generated by 
violations.23 The court did its part by, among other things, creating 
Kafkaesque obstacles to challenging citations and wantonly issuing bench 
warrants for FTAs.24 These warrants had the advantage, from the 
municipality’s perspective, of carrying additional fees.25 The police did 
                                                     
14. See infra section II.A. 
15. See infra section II.A. 
16. See infra section II.A. 
17. The warrant is typically framed as a judicial command. See infra note 130 and discussion. 
18. See infra notes 132–36 and discussion. 
19. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT]. 
20. See id. at 3–4, 42. 
21. Id. at 3–4. 
22. See id. at 10–15. 
23. Id. at 10, 14. 
24. See id. at 46–47 (noting that warrants for FTAs were issued without having provided adequate 
notice of required appearance date and required full pre-payment of bond in order to challenge 
unlawfully imposed warrant). 
25. Id. 
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their part by aggressively enforcing outstanding warrants, often 
discovering them in the course of unconstitutional stops and, of course, 
by issuing new citations.26 While Ferguson might be an extreme example, 
it is likely different from numerous other jurisdictions in quantity, not 
kind.27 
Although investigatory and non-compliance warrants are 
fundamentally different, the Supreme Court has extended the same 
deference to both as if they were identical.28 Most recently, in Utah v. 
Strieff,29 the Court held that criminal courts need not provide a remedy 
where an officer makes an unconstitutional stop but discovers a valid non-
compliance warrant in the course of the stop.30 The bench warrant in 
Strieff was for an unresolved parking violation.31 After unconstitutionally 
stopping Strieff, discovering the warrant, and arresting him, the officer 
searched Strieff incident to arrest and discovered narcotics.32 This 
evidence became the basis for a new criminal case against Strieff.33 He 
moved to suppress the narcotics.34 The Court held for Utah because the 
outstanding bench warrant was “valid . . . and . . . entirely unconnected 
with the stop.”35 The Court concluded that arrest was not the fruit of the 
constitutional violation but a “ministerial act” that the officer had “a 
sworn duty to carry out.”36 
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s characterization, an arrest pursuant to 
a non-compliance warrant is not “ministerial.”37 Non-compliance 
warrants actually create rather than restrain police discretion. As is true 
with criminal laws, outstanding warrants create opportunities for police 
leniency and severity, both at the institutional and individual levels. This 
creates the dangers of arbitrariness and opacity that have worried police-
discretion scholars since the 1960s.38 
                                                     
26. Id. at 10. 
27. See infra section II.A. 
28. See infra section I.B. 
29. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
30. Id. at 2060 (Utah conceded that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff). 
31. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
32. Id. at 2060 (majority opinion). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 2062. 
36. Id. at 2062–63. 
37. Id. at 2063. 
38. See infra section II.C.2. 
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The sheer number of outstanding non-compliance warrants in 
conjunction with their demographic concentration among poor and 
minority groups create powerful incentives for police to conduct 
unconstitutional stops of individuals who belong to those groups.39 Those 
incentives pre-existed Utah v. Strieff and would have continued to exist 
even if the case had been decided differently.40 The Supreme Court has 
long held that there is no exclusionary remedy for an unconstitutional 
seizure where it subsequently emerges that there is probable cause to 
detain.41 An outstanding warrant of any variety creates probable cause. 
For officers in the field, there will usually be no cost to carrying out 
unconstitutional warrant checks, save for the time and energy required to 
actually conduct the stop. The limited data that exist suggest that the 
warrant hit-rate in low-income minority neighborhoods will be higher 
than other neighborhoods.42 This creates the incentive for police to 
conduct random unconstitutional checks in the former.43 
Warrant enforcement plays a critical role in cementing class and race 
disparity in the criminal justice system by creating “arrest feedback.” Not 
only do arrests generate warrants and vice versa, but warrant enforcement 
can also generate new criminal cases. Over time, police warrant 
enforcement and courts’ warrant-issuing practices are recursive, 
producing mutually reinforcing demographic effects. Where there are a 
disproportionately high number of outstanding warrants for poor and 
minority defendants, police will target those communities for warrant 
enforcement. In the course of doing so, police will likely identify new 
criminal cases. This feedback supplies its own self-supporting rationale 
because the demographic profile of those with outstanding warrants 
reaffirms pre-existing, racialized notions about crime-prone 
neighborhoods and communities. 
In Part I, the Article describes the Fourth Amendment’s magisterial 
ideal and the warrant preference. Part II, the Article’s analytical core, 
demonstrates the prevalence and demographic concentration of non-
compliance warrants and shows why this is harmful. Non-compliance 
warrants create powerful incentives for police to violate the Constitution, 
confer unchecked enforcement discretion, and generate racial disparity. 
                                                     
39. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
40. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan wrote dissents urging a different result in the case. Id. at 2068 
(Sotomayor, J. dissenting); id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
41. This is on account of the Frisbie-Ker doctrine. See infra section II.C.1; United States v. Crews, 
445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (“Respondent is not himself a suppressible ‘fruit,’ and the illegality of his 
detention cannot deprive the Government of the opportunity to prove his guilt . . . .”).  
42. See infra section II.B. 
43. See infra section II.C.1. 
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Part III identifies the legal and policy prescriptions that flow from Part II. 
The Court should create a meaningful remedy for those seized 
unconstitutionally but for whom there is an outstanding non-compliance 
warrant. In the meantime, local courts have considerable power to limit 
non-compliance warrants’ harmful consequences. The Article identifies 
specific steps these courts might take. 
I. WARRANTS AND THE MAGISTERIAL IDEAL 
The Supreme Court has characterized a warrant as “a judicial mandate 
to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest” and any actual arrest 
that follows as a “ministerial act.”44 The “magisterial act” is the issuance 
of a warrant: it is the magistrate who wields the most significant decision-
making authority with regard to who is to be searched or seized. This view 
is embedded in the Court’s so-called “warrant preference.” It casts 
warrant-based searches and seizures as the gold standard of constitutional 
permissibility. The warrant preference hinges on an idealized view of the 
magistrate’s role: being “neutral and detached,”45 vigorously reviewing 
police applications, and granting warrants only where there is a high 
likelihood of securing criminal evidence. The magisterial ideal also 
provides that warrants, if issued at all, must be limited in scope so as to 
minimize interference with suspects’ and third parties’ constitutional 
interests. Ironically, the Court’s warrant preference has led it to curtail the 
exclusionary remedy for unconstitutional police conduct when that 
conduct is based upon an invalid warrant, or, as held in Utah v. Strieff, 
when a valid warrant emerges immediately following an unconstitutional 
stop.46 
A. The Warrant Preference 
A warrant is the gold standard for justifying searches and seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment.47 There are so many exceptions to the 
Court’s so-called warrant requirement that the “warrant preference” exists 
more as a rhetorical reality than a practical one.48 But the rhetoric 
                                                     
44. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062–63 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)). 
45. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
46. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060. 
47. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
48. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“Even before 
today’s decision, the ‘warrant requirement’ had become so riddled with exceptions that it was 
basically unrecognizable.”); Oren-Bar & Friedman, supra note 10, at 1612 (noting prevalence of 
exceptions).  
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expresses a foundational concept of criminal courts’ role in restraining the 
police. The Fourth Amendment’s text requires that warrants be 
particularized as to place, person, and object of interest.49 The Founders 
drafted the warrants clause to eliminate colonial courts’ much-reviled 
practice of issuing “general warrants.”50  General warrants authorized 
state agents to search and seize without temporal or geographic limitation 
or the specification of particular individuals or objects.51 General warrants 
were the dangerous warrants of the founding era. 
In Katz v. United States,52 the Supreme Court read the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be “reasonable” to 
entail a “warrant preference”: a search conducted without a warrant is “per 
se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”53 Whether the 
“warrant preference” continues to actually describe what the Fourth 
Amendment requires of police is questionable (if it ever did).54 But 
rhetorically, if not otherwise, the Court continues to suggest the warrant 
preference’s vitality.55 This reflects the settled view that police officers’ 
enforcement discretion is best vetted by a judicial actor in advance of an 
enforcement action.56 Justice Jackson’s formulation in Johnson v. United 
States57 remains among the most eloquent formulations of the warrant 
preference: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped 
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the 
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from 
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences 
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime. . . . When the right of privacy must 
                                                     
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
50. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 99–101 (1937). 
51. See id. 
52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
53. Id. at 357. 
54. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
55. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Patel, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015); Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 338 (2008); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
56. United States v. Chadwick, 43 U.S. 1, 9 (1977). 
57. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
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reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided 
by a judicial officer, not by a policeman . . . .58 
This language suggests the essential features of the warrant preference. 
First, and most importantly, Justice Jackson explicitly articulates the 
“magisterial ideal” in terms of judge and police being counter-positioned. 
Magistrates are to serve as “neutral and detached” bulwarks against 
officers’ potentially blinding “zealous[ness].”59 This framing rightly 
presupposes that police officers will systematically and severely discount 
civilian privacy and liberty interests in favor of their crime-control 
mandate. Search and seizure targets do not have a formal, pre-deprivation 
opportunity to be heard.60 Magistrates consider applications ex parte. A 
search’s precise target may be uncertain. Informing a known target of an 
impending search or arrest might undermine the state’s legitimate crime-
control purpose—many a target would just as well flee or destroy 
evidence.61 But the ex parte nature of the application means that the 
magistrate must account for the absent parties’ interests. 
The magisterial ideal hinges on “neutral[ity] and detach[ment],” which 
ensures that the search target’s interests are accounted for.62 Magistrates 
are to vigorously review the police’s facts regarding probable cause—
assuring themselves of witnesses’ credibility and that the established facts 
actually demonstrate a sufficiently high probability of guilt. In this vein, 
the Court has held it unconstitutional for a jurisdiction to create formal 
incentives for approving warrants.63 Even if issuing a warrant is justified, 
the magisterial ideal requires that the judge appropriately limit the scope 
of law enforcement conduct so as to minimize the intrusion endured by 
the target and third parties whose constitutional interests may be 
implicated.64 
                                                     
58. Id. at 13–14. 
59. Id. Commentators have long questioned the presupposition that magistrates can be neutral and 
detached in practice. See George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment and the Myth of 
Magisterial Discretion, 23 CONN. L. REV. 1, 26–29 (1990); Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search 
Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1207 (1987).  
60. Due process typically entails the right to some kind pre-deprivation hearing in the civil context, 
for instance if the government proposes to interfere with a property interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (deprivation of Social Security benefits). 
61. See Nock, supra note 59, at 12.  
62. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14. 
63. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 251 (1977) (invalidating system in which magistrates 
were compensated for each warrant issued).  
64. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560–63 (2004) (holding warrant invalid unless issuing 
magistrate specifies scope of permissible law enforcement conduct).  
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Critics have long charged that, practically speaking, actual magistrates 
are unable to provide the kind of rigorous pre-deprivation review that the 
magisterial ideal supposes.65 Without an adversarial process, magistrates 
are unable to meaningfully review the facts presented in officers’ warrant 
affidavits. That problem is compounded when police forum shop and 
magistrates have heavy caseloads.66 Officers will be inclined to forum 
shop for those magistrates who are least inclined to question officers’ 
applications.67 The incentives to conduct a searching review will be 
further diminished by the powerful docket clearing incentives that most 
criminal court magistrates confront.68 These structural features will lead 
magistrates to issue “rubber stamp” approvals for all but glaringly 
egregious warrant applications. The empirical evidence supporting this 
conclusion is dated,69 but critics’ assessment of the incentives confronting 
magistrates remains true. That said, limited empirical evidence suggests 
that the “hit rate” for warrant-based searches is higher than it is for non-
warrant-based searches.70 This suggests a second theoretical underpinning 
for the warrant preference, one recently highlighted by Professors 
Friedman and Bar-Gill.71 
When police officers are forced to systematically consider and 
articulate the bases for searches or seizures in advance, the constitutional 
quality of those enforcement actions will improve.72 There are two reasons 
for this. First, as Friedman and Bar-Gill emphasized, the pressure to think 
about and articulate the reasons for an enforcement action is likely to 
discourage officers from engaging in unconstitutional conduct.73 One 
hopes that officers will hear themselves articulating patently 
unconstitutional reasons for an enforcement action and think the better of 
it.74 Even if one does not fully accept this premise, it is plausible to think 
that officers take greater care investigating cases when they anticipate 
                                                     
65. See RONALD ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 422–23 (2016) 
(summarizing criticism); Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 10, at 1639–40 (same); Nock, supra note 
59, at 3–4 (characterizing notion of neutral and detached magistrate a “myth”). 
66. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 65, at 422–23.  
67. See id. 
68. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 270–72 (1992). 
69. See ALLEN, supra note 65, at 422 (summarizing findings). 
70. See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 913, 
922–23 (2009) (summarizing RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS 20 
(1985)). 
71. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 10, at 1641. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
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applying for a warrant.75 If that is generally true, it accounts for why 
warrant searches are more likely to generate contraband and undercuts the 
“rubber stamping” concerns articulated above. Second, as the late 
Professor Bill Stuntz noted, requiring police to obtain a warrant short-
circuits judges’ inclinations to engage in post hoc constitutional 
rationalizing when a police search or seizure is fruitful.76 When 
challenged after the fact, courts will view the constitutional challenge with 
a jaundiced eye because of deep-seated anxiety about letting guilty 
defendants go free.77 In contrast, reviewing enforcement action before it 
occurs permits a more clear-eyed judicial evaluation of police’s reasons. 
If one accepts the basic premises of the magisterial ideal, then one will 
view the most significant moments of law enforcement discretion as 
playing out in advance of an actual warrant-based search or seizure. Of 
course, there are choices to be made as to how and when to execute a 
warrant once issued.78 But the most significant questions—whether to 
search or seize at all and if so, how extensively—will have been decided 
by a judge in advance, rendering the actual search and seizure 
“ministerial.”79 That characterization is particularly apt where a warrant 
is specifically assigned to officers for execution: those officers are left to 
carry out discretionary decisions made by others.80 
B. Exclusion and the Warrant Preference 
The warrant preference has led the Court to create a “good faith” 
exception to the exclusionary rule in cases where police have obtained a 
warrant that is found to be defective following execution. Ordinarily, any 
evidence that is the product of a Fourth Amendment violation is 
inadmissible against the defendant.81 The good faith exception to 
exclusion is tantamount to giving police the benefit of the doubt when 
they apply for a warrant. In theory, that should encourage police to apply 
                                                     
75. See id. 
76. See William J. Stuntz, The Warrant and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 
892–93 (1991).  
77. See id.  
78. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38–39 (2003) (waiting fifteen to twenty seconds 
after knocking and announcing before forcibly entering dwelling pursuant to warrant “reasonable” 
under Fourth Amendment).  
79. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062–63 (2016) (citing United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)). 
80. See EDWARD CONLON, BLUE BLOOD 156 (2004) (discussing NYPD warrant execution teams). 
81. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963). 
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for warrants because they will have greater assurance of evidence being 
admitted than if they proceeded without one. 
In United States v. Leon,82 the police obtained a search warrant for 
Leon’s home based upon a police-corroborated tip that he was distributing 
narcotics.83 The initial tip came from a reliable source, but police 
nonetheless conducted an “extensive investigation” to corroborate the tip 
prior to applying for a warrant.84 Upon executing the warrant, the police 
discovered large quantities of narcotics.85 Leon successfully moved to 
suppress the narcotics evidence in the criminal case against him.86 The 
trial court concluded that even though the police had relied in “good faith” 
on what appeared to be a valid warrant, it was actually constitutionally 
deficient because the magistrate incorrectly concluded that there was 
probable cause to search Leon’s home.87 The Supreme Court agreed that 
the search was unconstitutional, but nonetheless held the seized narcotics 
admissible.88 The Court reasoned that where police and courts act in good 
faith, there is nothing to “deter”—and deterrence is the only function that 
the exclusionary rule serves.89 “Reasonable minds frequently may differ 
on the question of whether a particular affidavit establishes probable 
cause.”90 So one cannot fault a magistrate for making a mistake, the Court 
reasoned. Nor can one fault an officer for being no wiser for the 
magistrate’s error. 
Leon’s good faith exception was subsequently extended to different 
kinds of warrants and criminal justice errors. In Arizona v. Evans91 and 
Herring v. United States,92 the Court applied Leon to bench warrants93 
without recognizing any difference between them and the investigatory 
warrant at issue in Leon. A bench warrant is usually issued without any 
application from the police. A defendant’s failure to appear is among the 
                                                     
82. 468 U.S. 897 (1983). 
83. Id. at 901–03. 
84. Id. at 901. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 903. 
87. Id. at 904. There is no good faith where the officer unreasonably relies on what is an obviously 
defective warrant or where a magistrate behaves egregiously in issuing it. Id. at 914–15. 
88. Id. at 925–26.  
89. Id. at 916–17. 
90. Id. at 914. 
91. 514 U.S. 1 (1995). 
92. 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
93. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137; Evans, 514 U.S. at 14. 
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most common bases for a bench warrant.94 Nor was the “error” in these 
cases a magistrate’s reasonable mistake regarding a contestable, factual 
question. Rather, both Evans and Herring involved avoidable clerical 
errors.95 In Arizona v. Evans, the Supreme Court held evidence admissible 
against Evans even though it was seized following his arrest based upon 
a court clerk’s erroneous computer database entry indicating an 
outstanding warrant.96 Similarly, in Herring, the Court refused to exclude 
evidence seized following an arrest based upon an invalid bench warrant 
where a police department clerk failed to note that the warrant had been 
quashed.97 In both Evans and Herring, the arresting officers were not, and 
likely could not have been, aware of the clerical errors regarding the 
outstanding warrants. In Evans the Court credited the trial court’s 
conclusion that, as far as the officer was concerned, he was “bound to 
arrest” and “would [have been] derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest.”98 
If one accepts the Court’s view that the exclusionary rule is designed only 
to deter police officers (as opposed to courts or clerks),99 then Evans and 
Herring are on firm footing. But what happens if the police officer’s 
unconstitutional conduct precipitates an outstanding warrant’s discovery? 
Recently in Utah v. Strieff, the Court denied exclusion in a case where 
the outstanding warrant was valid but would not have been discovered 
absent the police officer’s unconstitutional conduct.100 Utah conceded that 
the officer in Strieff seized Strieff without reasonable suspicion in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.101 Ordinarily, the exclusionary rule 
would preclude the state from using any evidence seized as a result of the 
unconstitutional seizure.102 In Strieff, however, following the 
unconstitutional seizure, the officer discovered an outstanding bench 
warrant that authorized Strieff’s arrest.103 The Fourth Amendment permits 
a full search of a suspect’s person “incident to a lawful arrest” to ensure 
that the suspect is unable to harm the officer with a concealed weapon or 
                                                     
94. See infra section II.B.  
95. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 138; Evans, 514 U.S. at 4. 
96. Evans, 514 U.S. at 4. 
97. Herring, 555 U.S. at 138. 
98. Evans, 514 U.S. at 15. 
99. See, e.g., Herring, 555 U.S. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Christopher Slobogin, The 
Exclusionary Rule: Is It on Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 349–50 (2013) 
(summarizing contributing-symposium authors’ criticisms).  
100. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016). 
101. Id.  
102. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1962). 
103. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060. 
Sekhon – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:38 PM 
980 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:967 
 
destroy evidence.104 When announcing this per se rule in United States v. 
Robinson,105 the Court noted that officers may search incident to a “lawful 
arrest,”106 a condition that was clearly unsatisfied in Strieff. In dicta, the 
Strieff Court hinted that the outstanding bench warrant might retroactively 
cure the unconstitutional seizure, but it declined to anchor its actual 
holding in this unorthodox principle.107 
Instead, the Court anchored its holding in “attenuation doctrine,”108 
which creates an exception to the general rule that evidence seized as a 
result of an unconstitutional seizure must be excluded.109 Where there is a 
“break” in the causal chain linking unconstitutional conduct and evidence 
seized, the state may use the evidence against the defendant.110 Under 
Brown v. Illinois,111 three factors suggest a causal break: a significant 
break in “temporal proximity” separating the constitutional violation from 
the evidence’s discovery, “the presence of intervening circumstances,” 
and “the purpose and flagrancy of the official conduct.”112 
Strieff concluded that the pre-existing warrant for Strieff’s arrest 
satisfied the Brown factors, with particular emphasis on the second one.113 
The Court’s reasoning leaned heavily on its earlier decision in Segura v. 
United States.114 In Segura, law enforcement unlawfully seized the 
contents of an apartment by entering it and then securing it pending 
application for a search warrant.115 The magistrate issued a warrant based 
upon an application that contained only information learned in advance of 
the unlawful seizure.116 The Segura Court concluded that the warrant was 
therefore an “independent source”: it would have been granted even if the 
illegal seizure had never occurred.117 According to the Court, the illegal 
seizure in Segura did not ultimately compromise the magisterial ideal. 
                                                     
104. See United States v. Robinson 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). In turn, any evidence of a new crime 
discovered in the course of a search incident to arrest would be admissible under the “plain view” 
exception. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990). 
105. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).  
106. See id. at 235.  
107. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062. 
108. Id. at 2061. 
109. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1962). 
110. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061. 
111. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975). 
112. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04). 
113. Id. at 2062 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 n.21 (1984)). 
114. 468 U.S. 796 (1982). 
115. Id. at 800–04. 
116. See id. at 800–01. 
117. Id. at 813–15.  
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The problem with anchoring Strieff in Segura is that the warrant for 
Strieff’s arrest preceded the illegal seizure and was only discovered as a 
result of that unconstitutional conduct. 
The majority’s analysis of the Brown factors failed to ask whether the 
officer foresaw that there would be an outstanding warrant for Strieff even 
though foreseeability is the touchstone of the proximate cause analysis 
upon which attenuation is based.118 Both Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, 
in separate dissents, noted how readily foreseeable it must have been, 
given outstanding warrants’ prevalence in Utah, particularly for low-
income, racial minorities.119 The majority assumed that police in Utah 
were not routinely stopping individuals without cause to do warrant 
checks.120 The majority did, however, leave room for future defendants to 
move for exclusion in a case like Strieff’s where there was evidence of 
“systemic or recurrent” pattern of such unconstitutional stops.121 How a 
defendant might go about making such a showing, however, is unclear. 
While Strieff is not a model of analytical clarity, the result is consistent 
with what has become a long line of cases limiting the exclusionary rule’s 
availability whenever the deterrent effect on police is even arguably 
unclear.122 If one accepts the Court’s account of the exclusionary remedy 
as purely deterrence-based,123 it is difficult to see what marginal 
deterrence would be achieved by excluding the narcotics evidence 
retrieved from Strieff incident to his arrest. Having discovered the warrant 
for Strieff’s arrest, there was little to prevent the police officer from 
holding Strieff or prosecutors from proceeding on the underlying warrant 
                                                     
118. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. 
at 2072–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
119. See id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 2072–73 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
120. See id. at 2063 (majority opinion). 
121. Id. 
122. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (denying exclusion where police 
complied with substantive Fourth Amendment rule later found to be invalid); Herring v. United States, 
555 U.S. 135, 138–39 (2008) (same where arrest was based upon invalid warrant); Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594–95 (2006) (same where police violated “knock and announce” rule); 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1995) (same where arrest based on invalid warrant); United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925–26 (1983) (same); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489–94 (1976) (same 
for Fourth Amendment violation raised in habeas corpus proceeding). 
123. The Court has come to settle on deterring future law enforcement misconduct as the only 
rationale for the exclusionary remedy. See supra note 122. Commentators do not accept that this is 
the only rationale for the exclusionary remedy. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, 
and Illegitimacy: Why Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419, 
423–24 (2013); Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The 
Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 49 
(2010). Nor should they, given that the Court itself has provided additional rationales when extending 
the exclusionary remedy to the States. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657–59 (1961). 
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offense. Denying the State evidence seized incident to arrest for a new 
criminal case would not have likely altered the already compelling 
incentives for police to conduct unconstitutional warrant-check stops.124 
The result in Strieff seems particularly consistent with the results in 
Evans and Herring. Of course, in those cases, the arrests were based on 
invalid warrants. The Court, however, still permitted the State to use 
incriminating evidence seized incident to arrest even though the State had 
no constitutional basis to hold the suspect absent the contraband. In Strieff, 
the outstanding bench warrant was actually valid, meaning the State was 
entitled to hold him separate and apart from the evidence seized incident 
to arrest. The Strieff Court invoked the warrant preference, noting that a 
warrant is a “judicial mandate . . . to conduct a search or make an 
arrest.”125 Once a warrant has issued, the most significant and potentially 
dangerous dimension of police discretion has, in theory, been accounted 
for. Accordingly, the Strieff Court characterized a warrant arrest as a 
“ministerial act that was independently compelled” by the warrant.126 Of 
course the problem with this gloss in Strieff was that the officer was 
unaware of the warrant’s existence when he first stopped the defendant in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.127 
II. NON-COMPLIANCE WARRANTS AND POLICE 
DISCRETION 
The Supreme Court developed the warrant preference in cases 
involving “investigatory warrants”—warrants that appear to conform with 
the magisterial ideal, as was true in Leon. The sparse data that are 
available, however, suggest that most outstanding warrants in the United 
States are not of this variety at all. They are what I call “non-compliance 
warrants.” As described in section A below, non-compliance warrants do 
not aspire to the magisterial ideal. In the aggregate, these warrants create 
many of the constitutional dangers the Court’s warrant preference is 
supposed to guard against. 
As described in section B, non-compliance warrants number in the 
millions and likely constitute the majority of outstanding warrants in the 
                                                     
124. But see Michael Kimberly, Comment, Discovering Arrest Warrants: Intervening Police 
Conduct and Foreseeability, 118 YALE L.J. 177, 179 (2008) (arguing courts should suppress evidence 
discovered incident to arrest where foreseeable that an unconstitutional stop would result in the 
discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant). 
125. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 n.21). 
126. Id. at 2063. 
127. Id. at 2056. 
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United States at any given time. It is difficult to make conclusive 
quantitative claims about outstanding warrants nationwide because data 
collection is spotty at best.128 From the little data that can be gleaned from 
local sources, one can be confident that these warrants are not just 
pervasive but are also demographically concentrated among the poor and 
minorities. This in turn means that officers will reasonably be able to 
assume that the “hit rate” for outstanding warrants will be higher in poor, 
minority neighborhoods than elsewhere. 
Section C below demonstrates how, in the aggregate, outstanding non-
compliance warrants amplify law enforcement discretion in a manner that 
is fundamentally at odds with the warrant preference and the magisterial 
ideal. Outstanding non-compliance warrants incentivize unconstitutional 
seizures. They also generate a species of police enforcement discretion 
that is homologous to the discretion created by the criminal law itself and 
is problematic for many of the same reasons. Police discretion and racial 
disparity often go hand in hand. Non-compliance warrants are no 
exception. They generate what I call “arrest feedback,” which can 
exponentially increase race and class disparity in the criminal justice 
system. 
A. Non-Compliance Warrants 
The vast majority of outstanding warrants are not of the “investigatory” 
species preferred by the Court. Rather, most outstanding warrants are 
“non-compliance warrants.” These warrants do not reflect the magisterial 
ideal as a matter of theory, let alone practice. This section describes non-
compliance warrants’ key theoretical and empirical features. 
First, as the title suggests, a non-compliance warrant is an arrest 
warrant issued for failing to comply with a legal obligation imposed on an 
individual, typically by a court or executive official in connection with a 
criminal or traffic-related proceeding.129 Less frequently, the obligation is 
imposed in connection with a civil proceeding. Like an investigatory 
arrest warrant, a non-compliance warrant authorizes police officers to 
arrest a specific individual.130 But the two operate towards different ends. 
                                                     
128. David M. Bierie, Fugitives in the United States, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 327, 329 (2014). 
129. In some jurisdictions, probation officers and court clerks have the authority to issue bench 
warrants without prior judicial approval. See NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 
§ 23:13 (1999). 
130. In most states, this is framed in terms of a judicial “command[]” to arrest, see, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1529 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-46 (2015), a point noted by the Supreme 
Court in Utah v. Strieff. 136 S. Ct. at 2062. As discussed in detail below however, that a bench warrant 
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With an investigatory warrant, the question is not just whether police will 
be permitted to interfere with an individual’s liberty or privacy interest, 
but whether the individual will be forcibly drawn into a criminal court’s 
jurisdiction. Should police be permitted to put the suspect on the path to 
becoming a defendant?131 In contrast, with non-compliance warrants, the 
question is how best to achieve submission from a defendant or convict 
who is already within the court’s jurisdiction. 
The most common example of a non-compliance warrant is for failing 
to appear before a court. When a defendant does not appear for a court 
date, judges typically have the authority to issue a “bench warrant” for the 
individual’s arrest.132 The most common context in which individuals fail 
to appear is in the traffic context, where the obligation to appear is 
imposed by a police officer in the course of issuing a citation. Failure to 
pay the fine by the specified date or to appear in court for the scheduled 
hearing will often result in an arrest warrant. Similarly, a judge may issue 
a bench warrant for criminal defendants who fail to appear for any 
hearings at which their appearance was required; judges often have 
discretion to compel defendant’s presence at any hearing they choose.133 
Another common species of non-compliance warrant is a “violator’s 
warrant” issued for a probationer or parolee who (there is reason to think) 
has failed to satisfy one or more conditions of release.134 The conditions 
that a judge might impose as part of a probationary sentence are vast, 
including payment of various fines, attending counseling, obtaining 
substance abuse treatment, or submitting to drug testing.135 Failure to 
satisfy any one of these conditions may result in a judge issuing a warrant 
for the probationer’s arrest. Some states even allow probation officers to 
issue arrest warrants without judicial approval.136 Non-compliance 
warrants may sometimes even be issued in order to enforce conditions that 
were imposed in a civil proceeding. For example, family court judges are 
often authorized to issue bench warrants for a parent—typically a father—
                                                     
is, formally speaking, a command does not extinguish the discretion that police typically enjoy to 
enforce (or not enforce) such warrants. See infra section II.C.2.  
131. This distinction is expressed, for example, in the distinction drawn between a “warrant of 
arrest” and a “bench warrant” under New York Law. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20 (McKinney 
2017).  
132. Different jurisdictions embrace different names for bench warrants such as “writs of arrest” 
or “capias warrants.” 
133. Presence can also be required by statute. For an example of how requiring defendants to appear 
can be used to generate public revenue, see DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 48. 
134. See COHEN, supra note 129, § 23:12. 
135. See id.  
136. See id. § 23:13. 
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who has failed to make payments or otherwise comply with a child-
support order.137 
A second feature of non-compliance warrants that is intimately related 
to the first is that judges and police are aligned rather than counter-
positioned as the warrant preference and magisterial ideal presuppose. 
The police apply for an investigatory warrant ex parte, and the 
magistrate’s task is to ensure absent parties’ constitutional interests are 
accounted for.138 In contrast, courts issue non-compliance warrants of 
their own accord and then turn to the police to execute them at their behest. 
Non-compliance warrants are not formally ex parte, but there is usually 
little if any practical opportunity for the defendant’s interests to be 
considered. For example, defendants are usually not represented by 
counsel at traffic hearings. Similarly, those accused of probation 
violations are not constitutionally entitled to counsel for probation 
revocation proceedings, let alone for a warrant hearing if there is one.139 
Third, courts typically have wider discretion to issue (or not issue) non-
compliance warrants than they do investigatory warrants. For example, 
California law dictates that an arrest warrant “shall” issue upon the 
police’s showing of probable cause.140 In contrast, California law is 
permissive with regard to bench warrants: a judge “may” issue a bench 
should an individual fail to appear.141 But even where this distinction is 
not formally expressed, it likely exists as a practical matter. To the extent 
that officers submit a warrant application that demonstrates probable 
cause, a judge is likely to feel compelled to grant it.142 
Because non-compliance warrants are designed to secure submission, 
they exist on a spectrum with other coercive, behavior-inducing 
techniques. Among the least coercive options is for a judge to simply 
postpone the court matter requiring the defendant’s presence. State laws 
may also create a range of options depending on the nature of the 
proceeding. Some states, for example, allow for the suspension of an 
alleged traffic violator’s driver’s license.143 Similarly, in the probation 
                                                     
137. See Nirej Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, 17 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 176, 193–96 (2014). 
138. See supra section I.A (discussing warrant preference and magisterial ideal). 
139. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784–85 (1973). 
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 817(a)(1) (West 2017). 
141. Id. § 978.5(a). But see FED R. CRIM. P. 9(a) (upon request from government, court “must[ ] 
issue a warrant” for defendant that fails to appear).  
142. This, again, is the basis for “rubber stamping” criticism that has been often leveled against 
warrant. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying discussion. 
143. See Larry Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due 
Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 16–17, 16 n.64 
(summarizing state laws).  
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context, judges have a range of coercive options for inducing 
compliance.144 
The existence of coercive options, however, does not necessarily mean 
that judges exercise their formal discretion with sensitivity to the unique 
circumstances of any particular defendant’s case. In most state and local 
courts, the opposite is true.145 Non-compliance warrants tend to be issued 
in rote fashion and in high volume. Most state and local criminal and 
traffic courts are examples of high-volume courts. Time and resource 
constraints lead such courts to deliver an abbreviated version of the 
process popularly associated with criminal law. Many have called this 
“assembly-line justice.”146 Assembly-line justice does not permit serious 
inquiry into whether individuals are actually guilty, let alone why they 
failed to appear. An absent defendant represents an opportunity to quickly 
move onto the next case. Even if a judge were inclined to inquire as to 
why a particular defendant failed to appear, there would frequently be no 
one to question. The judge is likely to just issue a bench warrant. Where 
defendants fail to appear for proceedings in which they are represented, 
judges might elect not to issue warrants if counsel proffer compelling 
explanations for the absence. But the more crowded a court’s docket the 
more perfunctory such inquiries will be, and the more inclined the judge 
to issue a warrant and move on to other cases.147 
Fourth, non-compliance warrants do not generally operate as directives 
to specific officers to seek out and arrest particular individuals. Instead, 
non-compliance warrants tend to function as “red flags” in law 
enforcement databases. These warrants remain suspended in the digital 
ether until an officer comes across the individual in the future, identifies 
the outstanding warrant, and has reason to execute it.148 State law 
sometimes requires police agencies to enter outstanding warrants into 
federal, state, and local databases.149 The entries consist of information 
identifying the suspect/defendant along with information regarding the 
nature of the warrant issued. Law enforcement may also include 
information regarding the so-called “pick-up radius” which signals the 
jurisdiction’s willingness to expend resources to obtain the 
                                                     
144. See Sekhon, supra note 137, at 187 (summarizing techniques available and judicial 
discretion). 
145. See FEELEY, supra note 68, at 225–27. 
146. See Sekhon, supra note 137, at 190. 
147. See FEELEY, supra note 68, at 270–72. 
148. See infra section II.C.2 (describing individual officers’ discretion). 
149. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 980 (West 2017).  
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suspect/defendant if apprehended outside the jurisdiction.150 Some police 
departments may focus on enforcing the most serious non-compliance 
warrants. For example, in jurisdictions that have dedicated parole and 
probation officers, specific officers may execute warrants for individuals 
alleged to have violated the terms of supervised release.151 But even there, 
it is likely to be only the most serious cases that receive attention from 
these officers. 
The less serious the offense, and the more congested the docket, the 
less likely that a specific officer will be charged with executing the 
warrant or that the issuing jurisdiction will pick up the suspect if 
apprehended outside the jurisdiction. For example, resource constraints 
make it impossible for most jurisdictions to dispatch specific officers to 
arrest those who fail to appear for traffic violations.152 Jurisdictions are 
also unlikely to expend resources to pick up such a suspect from a 
neighboring jurisdiction, let alone extradite the suspect from out of state, 
even if detained over a warrant. That means that law enforcement in most 
jurisdictions will not arrest an individual pursuant to an outstanding 
warrant unless it is clear the person is within the pick-up radius specified 
in the database.153 
Although data are spotty at best,154 it is safe to assume that the majority 
of outstanding warrants in the United States are non-compliance warrants, 
not investigatory warrants. The next section explains why. 
B. Pervasiveness and Demographic Concentration 
The number of misdemeanors and traffic cases in the United States 
outpace felony cases by an order of magnitude,155 making it virtually 
certain that these cases generate the most non-compliance warrants in the 
United States. Extrapolating from the little data that are available on 
outstanding warrants confirms the intuition that most outstanding 
warrants in the United States are non-compliance warrants based upon 
                                                     
150. See, e.g., CINCINNATI POLICE DEP’T, POLICE DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE MANUAL 12.727 
(2010), http://cincinnati-oh.gov/police/department-references/police-department-procedure-manual/ 
[http://perma.cc/L667-5BKM]. 
151. See COHEN, supra note 134, § 23:16. 
152. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 56 (noting this point for Ferguson municipal court). 
153. See Natalie Tendall, Why Some Criminals Are Getting Away with Their Crime, 2 NEWS (May 
14, 2015, 6:11 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20171018031013/http:/wdtn.com/investigative-sto 
ry/why-some-criminals-are-getting-away-with-their-crime/) [https://perma.cc/XVQ8-JWYR].  
154. Bierie, supra note 128, at 329 (no comprehensive empirical research on the question). 
155. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 280–81 (2011). 
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misdemeanor or traffic offenses.156 National and state databases contain 
records of nearly eight million outstanding warrants, more than half of 
which are for minor crimes, traffic-related offenses, and violations of civil 
orders like child support obligations.157 This understates the total number 
of outstanding warrants because state and national databases are biased in 
favor of warrants for more serious crimes, most of which are likely to 
involve investigatory warrants.158 Local police agencies enter warrants 
into national and state databases in part to signal (to other jurisdictions) 
how willing they are to expend resources on extraditing the wanted 
individual.159 Separate and apart from federal and state databases, many 
urban and suburban jurisdictions maintain their own local databases.160 
The number of total outstanding warrants in the United States would 
require a tally of all these local databases’ contents. That number is sure 
to be much higher than eight million. For example, the outstanding 
warrants for FTAs on NYPD-issued citations for minor offenses, often 
                                                     
156. See GREG HAGER, KY. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 236, 
IMPROVED COORDINATION AND INFORMATION COULD REDUCE THE BACKLOG OF UNSERVED 
WARRANTS vii, ix (2005), http://www.lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/rr326.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPB6-ECC4] 
(most outstanding warrants in Kentucky are bench warrants for minor misconduct); SCI. 
APPLICATIONS INT’L CORP. & RANDALL GUYNES & RUSSEL WOLFF, INST. LAW & JUSTICE, 
UNSERVED ARREST WARRANTS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 12–13, 23 (2004), http://www.ilj.org/ 
publications/docs/Unserved_Arrest_Warrants.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP65-WSSA] (same for 
Montgomery County, Maryland and Hennepin County, Minneapolis) [hereinafter UNSERVED ARREST 
WARRANTS STUDY]; Andrea F. Siegel, In Anne Arundel, Tax Refunds Lure People with Outstanding 
Warrants to Come Clean, BALT. SUN (Mar. 17, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-
17/news/bs-md-ar-tax-refund-warrant-20130312_1_warrants-sheriff-ron-bateman-maryland-sheriffs 
[http://perma.cc/4FLH-ACYF] (three-fourths of outstanding warrants in large suburban Baltimore 
county are bench warrants for traffic and minor offenses); Brief for Respondent at 1–5, Utah v. Strieff, 
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373) (summarizing additional sources of data) 
[hereinafter Respondent’s Brief]. 
157.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL 
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2014, at tbl.5a (2015) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS]. 
158. Bierie, supra note 128, at 329. 
159. Id.  
160. Such local databases are common and will typically reflect a fuller record of all the warrants 
issued by a jurisdiction. Many warrants for minor violations may not be eligible for inclusion in 
federal and state databases. See, e.g., CITY OF VA. BEACH POLICE DEP’T, WARRANT TRACKING AND 
SERVICE FIELD GUIDE 4 (2015), https://www.vbgov.com/government/departments/police/ 
Documents/WarrantTracking%20and%20Service%20%20Field%20Guide.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HQ9Z-TX2M] (noting that local database will contain more comprehensive record 
of local warrants than federal and state databases); TEXARKANA, TEX. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL 
ORDERS MANUAL § 3 (2015), http://ci.texarkana.tx.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2677 [http://per 
ma.cc/EK8T-HPYW] (same); see also CITY OF MILWAUKEE, FIRE & POLICE COMMISSION, FPC 
INFORMATIONAL MEMORANDUM CONFIRMATION OF WARRANTS PRIOR TO ARREST (2013), 
http://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/Groups/cityFPC/Reports/130505FPCMemoreWarrants.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/53P3-LJUD] (noting existence of local database).  
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called “desk summons,” are the equivalent of more than 15% of all records 
in federal and state databases.161 
Recent media reports suggest that in New York City alone there are 
over one million outstanding warrants for FTAs on “desk summons”—
police issued-citations for minor offenses.162 New York City police have 
discretion to issue “summons” in lieu of arrest for a host of minor offenses 
such as drinking in public, obstructing a sidewalk, jumping a subway 
turnstile, and so on.163 Aggressive enforcement against minor offenses has 
been central to so-called “broken windows” policing in New York City, a 
policing strategy that purports to reduce serious crimes by eliminating the 
“disorder” that encourages perpetrators of more serious crimes.164 Desk 
summons may seem gentler than arresting alleged violators outright, but 
when such individuals fail to appear in court on a summons or pay a fine, 
or if there is a processing error on the city’s part, an arrest warrant will 
typically issue.165 In 2014, warrants for FTAs issued in more than one 
third of summons cases.166 
Outside of New York City, traffic infractions constitute a significant 
portion of municipal and county court dockets. Correspondingly, they 
tend to generate significant numbers of FTAs. For example, a 2004 study 
focusing on outstanding warrants in suburban Washington, D.C. and 
suburban Minneapolis also concluded that most outstanding warrants 
were bench warrants for failing to appear in court on traffic-related and 
other minor charges.167 Seventy-two percent of the outstanding warrants 
in the suburban D.C. county were for FTAs or probation violations.168 
One-third of those FTAs were traffic-related, while another 27% were for 
minor offenses.169 In the suburban Minneapolis County, nearly half the 
                                                     
161. See Allegra Kirkland, How 1.2 Million New Yorkers Ended up with Arrest Warrants, BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2015, 9:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-12-million-new-yorkers-end 
ed-up-with-arrest-warrants-2015-8 [http://perma.cc/GL3J-L2QM]; Sarah Ryley et al., EXCLUSIVE: 
Daily News Analysis Finds Racial Disparities in Summonses in ‘Broken Windows’ Policing, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/summons-broken-
windows-racial-disparity-garner-article-1.1890567 [https://perma.cc/C2Y5-3HSW]. 
162. See Kirkland, supra note 161. 
163. See Ryley et al, supra note 161. 
164. See id.; Kirkland, supra note 161. 
165. See Kirkland, supra note 161. 
166. See Michael Schwirtz, New York City Plans to Transform Summons Process, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 2015, at A21. 
167. UNSERVED ARREST WARRANTS STUDY, supra note 156, at 12–13, 23. 
168. Id. at 13. 
169. Id. at 14.  
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outstanding warrants stemmed from traffic offenses and another 20% 
were for minor offenses.170 
Ferguson, Missouri presents a troubling case study of non-compliance 
warrants’ overuse. The DOJ investigated Ferguson after Michael Brown’s 
shooting death sparked long-simmering community resentments.171 The 
DOJ’s report highlighted the extent to which the city used its criminal 
justice machinery to extract revenue from Ferguson’s citizens.172 Central 
to this scheme was aggressive enforcement against “minor violations such 
as parking infractions, traffic tickets, or housing code violations,” many 
of which carried unusually high fines in comparison to nearby 
jurisdictions.173 The municipal court was profligate in issuing bench 
warrants for failures to pay and appear, issuing 9,000 warrants in 2013 
alone. This amounted to one warrant for every two Ferguson residents.174 
Compounding matters for Ferguson residents, the warrants carried 
additional fees. While Ferguson was extreme in its unitary focus on 
revenue, other municipalities in St. Louis County appear to have taken a 
similar approach.175 And revenue motives likely inform even large cities’ 
interest in citations and warrants.176 
Evidence and intuition suggest that outstanding non-compliance 
warrants will not be evenly distributed across a jurisdiction. Rather, the 
demographic and geographic distribution of warrants will likely reflect 
(and reinforce)177 police enforcement patterns. To the extent that the poor 
and minorities are overrepresented in most jurisdictions’ criminal justice 
systems, the same holds true for those who have outstanding non-
compliance warrants. Few jurisdictions make information about 
outstanding warrants available, and fewer still provide demographic 
information. There are a few exceptions. For example, in Virginia Beach, 
approximately 50% of outstanding warrants listed in the publicly 
available database are non-compliance warrants and 53% of those sought 
                                                     
170. Id. at 23. Hennepin County did not keep track of warrants by FTA or probation violations, but 
rather only the underlying criminal charge. Id. 
171. See Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Ferguson Tainted by Bias, Justice Department Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2015, at A1. 
172. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 10. 
173. See id. at 3, 55. 
174. It is unclear what portion of the warrants issued are for individuals who are not Ferguson 
residents. 
175. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 10. 
176. See Ryley et al., supra note 161 (noting that summons fees constituted second largest source 
of revenue for New York City’s criminal courts). 
177. See infra section II.C.3. 
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on non-compliance warrants are Black in a city that is only 20% Black.178 
In Omaha, Nebraska, more than 40% of all outstanding warrants listed are 
for FTAs, and 33% of those sought are Black in a city that is only 13% 
Black.179 In Austin, Texas, 20% of those sought for outstanding non-
compliance warrants are Black in a city that is only 7% Black.180 As is 
true for virtually all large American cities,181 all three of these cities are 
residentially segregated by race and class.182 This likely means that the 
geographic distribution of outstanding warrants will skew towards the 
neighborhoods in which poor Black residents are concentrated. 
Even when specific warrant data are unavailable, one can safely 
conclude that minorities are overrepresented amongst those with 
outstanding warrants whenever enforcement is focused on minority 
communities, as it frequently is.183 New York City’s broken windows 
policing provides a compelling example. It expressly and aggressively 
targeted low-income minority neighborhoods for low-level police 
enforcement.184 High-volume street stops and citations were important 
                                                     
178. Virginia Beach maintains a publicly available database of outstanding warrants. See About 
ePRO, CITY OF VA. BEACH, https://eprodmz.vbgov.com/MainUI/Home/HomeDefault.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HQ9Z-TX2M]. Data were retrieved from this database between December 8, 2017 
and December 13, 2017 and placed into an Excel spreadsheet. Individuals with multiple outstanding 
warrants were identified and excluded in order to reflect the number of unique individuals for whom 
there was at least one outstanding warrant. Excel spreadsheets are on file with author. Warrants 
characterized as “CAPIAS” were used as a proxy for non-compliance warrants.  
179. Omaha maintains a publicly available database of outstanding warrants. See Warrants, 
OMAHA POLICE DEP’T, http://police.cityofomaha.org/warrants?searchterm=A [https://perma.cc/U3 
4Q-SY5D]. For a description of how data was collected and sorted, see supra note 178.  
180. Austin maintains a publicly available database of outstanding warrants. See Austin Police 
Dep’t, Court Services Unit, AUSTIN TEXAS, http://www.austintexas.gov/department/court-services-
unit [https://perma.cc/4RAL-JT3G]. The database lists outstanding warrants issued by the Municipal 
Court, which has jurisdiction over misdemeanors, and the Austin Community Court, which is a 
problem-solving court. All of the outstanding warrants listed are for cases in which a bond amount 
was set, suggesting that they are all non-compliance warrants. No publicly available information was 
discovered regarding investigatory warrants; thus no conclusion could be reached regarding the ratio 
of non-compliance warrants in relation to total warrants. For description of how data was collected 
and sorted, see supra note 178. 
181. See SEAN F. REARDON & KENDRA BISCHOFF, GROWTH IN THE RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 
OF FAMILIES BY INCOME 1970–2009, at 14 & fig.2 (2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity 
/Data/Report/report111111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TGL-EYF8] (describing increasing income 
segregation for minority groups in a large distribution of American cities). 
182. Brown University’s Diversity and Disparities website includes sortable lists of American 
cities by income and race segregation. Diversity and Disparities, SPATIAL STRUCTURES SOC. SCI., 
BROWN U., https://s4.d.brown.edu/projects/diversity/Data/data.htm [https://perma.cc/C2LN-KMF9]. 
183. See infra section II.C.3. 
184. Nirej Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1208–10 
(2011). 
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parts of this policing strategy.185 The vast majority of those who received 
violations were minorities.186 Similarly, the DOJ noted that in Ferguson, 
a disproportionately high proportion of citations, arrests, and vehicle stops 
in Ferguson were of minorities.187 Accordingly, in both settings, the vast 
majority of FTAs generated by these citations would inevitably be for 
minorities as well. 
Outstanding non-compliance warrants’ abundance further suggests that 
there will be a substantial number of arrests based upon such warrants. In 
New York City, for example, aggressive warrant enforcement was an 
express part of the broken windows policing strategy.188 A 2004 study of 
suburban Washington, D.C. and Minneapolis counties suggested that 
roughly half and quarter of all arrests in each respective jurisdiction were 
based upon a warrant.189 In her Strieff dissent, Justice Sotomayor noted 
data from New Orleans suggesting that one third of arrests were based 
upon “traffic or misdemeanor warrants,” most of which were presumably 
of the non-compliance variety.190 One would expect demographic 
disparities reflected in outstanding warrants to track through to the 
demographic profile of those arrested. The DOJ noted that the limited data 
available for Ferguson suggested just such a pattern in warrant-based 
arrests.191 Without concrete demographic data though, these conclusions 
are informed conjecture.192 
Greater data collection regarding warrant issuance and enforcement is 
urgently needed. But we can be confident that non-compliance warrants 
                                                     
185. See Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/12frisk.html [https://perma.cc/W9WL-DZ9X]. 
186. See id.; Sarah Ryley, supra note 161 (“Roughly 81% of 7.3 million people hit with violations 
between 2001 and 2013 were black and Hispanic . . . .”); Schwirtz, supra note 166 (comparing 
summons issued for riding bicycle on the sidewalk in middle-class White neighborhood versus lower-
income, Black neighborhood). 
187. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4. 
188. See Norimitsu Onishi, Police Announce Crackdown on Quality-of-Life Offenses, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/13/nyregion/police-announce-crackdown-on-
quality-of-life-offenses.html [https://perma.cc/3R5E-WBTK].  
189. See Guynes & Wolff, supra note 156, at 25, 27 (analyzing Montgomery County and Hennepin 
County). The reports do not specify what portion of these arrests were based on non-compliance type 
warrants.  
190. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
191. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 65. 
192. See Radical Washentaw, Why Are Black People in Ypsilanti Disproportionately Arrested on 
Bench Warrants, RAW (Jan. 14, 2016), https://radicalwashtenaw.org/2016/01/14/why-are-black-
people-in-ypsilanti-disproportionately-arrested-on-bench-warrants/ [https://perma.cc/22BE-VTTB] 
(noting high numbers of FTA arrests of Black men, but lack of data regarding demographic profile of 
those for whom warrants issued). 
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are prevalent and, in many jurisdictions, demographically and 
geographically concentrated. This allows us to raise deeper questions 
about the incentives these warrants create. 
C. Warrants, Discretion, and Disparity 
The surfeit of outstanding bench warrants, coupled with the absence of 
a remedy for unconstitutional seizures, generates three related sets of 
harms. First, it creates incentives for police officers to engage in 
unconstitutional stops. Second, these warrants amplify police discretion, 
raising the practical dangers of opacity and arbitrariness. Finally, police 
likely use that discretionary authority in a manner that increases race and 
class disparities in the criminal justice system. This occurs through arrest 
feedback loops. Put simply, arrests beget warrants and warrants beget 
arrests. Urban ethnography has begun to illustrate the extent to which 
outstanding warrants structure the social reality of poor, young men of 
color. In extreme cases, these warrants can even have tragic 
consequences, as recently suggested by the Walter Scott shooting in South 
Carolina.193 
1. Unconstitutional Seizures 
The sheer numbers of outstanding warrants and their geographic 
concentration create powerful incentives for police to engage in 
unconstitutional, suspicionless seizures.194 A defendant cannot rely on the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary remedy if a warrant was discovered in 
the course of an unconstitutional seizure. This incentive structure was 
established long before the Court decided Utah v. Strieff. In Strieff the 
Court, over fierce dissents, turned a blind eye to that incentive structure, 
ratifying unconstitutional police practices.195 Justice Sotomayor wrote a 
powerful rebuke to the majority,196 but even she failed to acknowledge the 
                                                     
193. Walter Scott was shot in North Charleston, South Carolina after he ran from a police officer 
who had stopped him for a minor traffic infraction. Scott’s family members speculated that he ran for 
fear of arrest on a warrant stemming from outstanding child support. See Frances Robles & Shaila 
Dewan, Skip Child Support. Go to Jail. Lose Job. Repeat., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2015), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/us/skip-child-support-go-to-jail-lose-job-repeat.html 
[https://perma.cc/4XDE-65FP]. 
194. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 17 (noting that many unlawful police stops in 
Ferguson, Missouri “appear to have been driven, in part, by an officer’s desire to check whether the 
subject had a municipal arrest warrant pending”). 
195. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
196. See id.  
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full dimensions of the constitutional problems that outstanding warrants 
can create. 
In theory, the police may not randomly stop people for warrant checks. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits stops without individualized 
suspicion197—meaning reasonable suspicion that an individual has or is 
about to commit an offense.198 Officers may constitutionally conduct a 
warrant check in the course of an otherwise lawful stop.199 When an 
officer stops an individual for the sole purpose of conducting a warrant 
check, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that there is an 
outstanding warrant for that person.200 But the protection afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment is only as vital as the remedy made available for its 
violation. And in most cases, there is no meaningful remedy afforded 
those who are subjected to an unconstitutional stop for a warrant check. 
On its face, Strieff would appear to have been a case about 
unconstitutional seizures. But Strieff never made the argument that Utah 
could not hold him pursuant to the outstanding warrant. Rather, Strieff 
argued that the State should not have been permitted to use the fruits of 
the search incident to his unconstitutional arrest.201 Officers discovered 
narcotics evidence while searching him incident to arrest and Utah sought 
to convict Strieff of a new crime based on that evidence.202 Why did Strieff 
not challenge the seizure directly rather than indirectly through the 
evidence seized incident to the arrest? 
The simple (and question-begging) answer is that exclusion is available 
for unconstitutionally seized evidence but not for an unconstitutionally 
seized suspect for whom there is probable cause to detain.203 As a practical 
matter, the fruits of a search conducted following arrest represent the only 
vehicle for challenging many arrests’ constitutionality.204 In Strieff, the 
Court, like all the parties and amici, assumed this point. Had the officer 
failed to find any incriminating evidence incident to arrest, Strieff would 
have had no basis for seeking a remedy in criminal court. 
                                                     
197. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
198. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
199. See Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (suggesting that 
conducting warrant check during legitimate traffic stop is constitutionally permissible). 
200. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
201. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064. 
202. Id. at 2059–60. 
203. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (“Respondent is not himself a 
suppressible ‘fruit,’ and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the Government of the 
opportunity to prove his guilt . . . .”). 
204. ALLEN, supra note 65, at 500 n.18. 
Sekhon – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:38 PM 
2018] DANGEROUS WARRANTS 995 
 
The Court has stated that the exclusionary rule does not apply to a 
defendant’s person.205 This idea first took shape in the nineteenth century 
and was later expressed as the Frisbie-Ker doctrine.206 The historical 
record prior to that is ambiguous.207 There is however, some support for 
the notion that dismissal was sometimes afforded criminal defendants for 
official misconduct occurring in connection with arrest.208 
Frisbie-Ker holds that due process does not require a criminal court to 
consider how a defendant was brought before it, but only that the 
defendant receive a fair trial once there.209 Neither Frisbie nor Ker 
involved law enforcement’s violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, 
in Ker, the earlier of the two cases, a federal agent unlawfully kidnapped 
the defendant from Peru for criminal trial in the United States.210 Ker’s 
arrest constituted a kidnapping because it was not carried out in precise 
accord with the United States’s extradition agreement with Peru. The 
federal agent had the “necessary papers” to obtain custody of Ker, but the 
agent failed to “[present] them to any officer of the Peruvian 
government.”211 Peru was not party to the litigation; nor is there mention 
in the opinion of its having asserted any sovereign injury as a result of the 
federal agent’s conduct. Extradition is more a matter of sovereign 
prerogative than an individual right.212 That is important context for the 
Court’s statement that “we do not think [a defendant] is entitled to say that 
he should not be tried at all” because of “mere irregularities in the manner 
in which he may be brought into . . . custody.”213 Moreover, Ker was 
decided in 1886, before the advent of substantive due process concepts, 
modern procedural due process, or the exclusionary rule. Sixty years later, 
Frisbie invoked the same language in an interstate extradition case 
                                                     
205. See Crews, 445 U.S. at 474. 
206. See id. (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)). 
207. See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009–10) (researching pre-foundation judicial practice is challenging because 
so little of it was reported). 
208. See id. at 22–25. The analogy to contemporary criminal justice practice is also quite weak 
given that criminal justice was not bureaucratized and constitutional violations were not thought 
attributable to the government. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 621–22, 663–67 (1999). 
209. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522 (citing Ker, 119 U.S. at 444). 
210. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 442 (noting that extradition treaty between United States and Peru did not create any 
positive right on the part of defendant to asylum in Peru). 
213. Id. at 440. 
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without any new analysis.214 All of this is to say, Frisbie-Ker provides 
weak conceptual moorings for denying a remedy for unconstitutional 
seizures. 
Frisbie-Ker aside, granting an exclusionary style remedy for 
unconstitutional seizures might seem impractical. Excluding the person 
would amount to a court setting a wanted individual free but without 
legally altering the individual’s wanted status. Since the constitutional 
problem is with the stop, not the warrant, there would be no legal basis 
for quashing it. To release a wanted defendant is to invite formalistic 
contrivance. The judge would “exclude” the defendant, who would then 
exit the court to confront the sheriff waiting just outside, ready to arrest 
on the valid warrant.215 Perhaps clever defendants would find a way to 
evade the waiting sheriff, but letting a legitimately wanted individual run 
seems strange. Criminal prosecution “is not a fox hunt,” Justice Holmes 
quipped.216 The Court has dealt with this by simply eliminating the 
possibility of a practical remedy for an unconstitutional seizure where a 
valid warrant exists.217 That too seems strange. But it is a defensible 
choice if one accepts a magisterial view of warrants (or extradition). In 
this sense, Frisbie-Ker returns us to Utah v. Strieff. 
Both Frisbie-Ker and Strieff are based on the view that an arrest 
conducted pursuant to judicial order is “ministerial.” Where a magistrate 
has made the choices as to who is to be arrested or what is to be searched, 
the dangers of law enforcement discretion are substantially contained. To 
use the Court’s language in Strieff, an extradition order, like an arrest 
warrant, is “a judicial mandate to an officer to . . . make an arrest.”218 
Warrants force the police to make their case for searching/seizing in 
advance of doing so. 
The problem with this conception is that in cases like Evans, Herring, 
and Strieff, the Court proceeds as if all warrants were cut of the same 
magisterial cloth when, in fact, they are not. In the same vein, Frisbie-Ker 
has been generalized to apply far more broadly than those cases’ unique 
facts might have suggested.219 Generalizing in this way has allowed the 
Court to overlook the extent to which some, likely most, species of 
warrants generate precisely the kind of problematic enforcement 
discretion that has long been the Fourth Amendment’s core concern. 
                                                     
214. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. 
215. See id.  
216. See Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6, 13 (1916) (“But merely to be declared free in a room with 
the marshal standing at the door having another warrant in his hand would be an empty form.”). 
217. Cf. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 474 n.20 (1980). 
218. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016). 
219. See Crews, 445 U.S. at 474 (1980). 
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The unconstitutional practices described here are not likely to be evenly 
distributed across most jurisdictions. The greatest protection afforded any 
individual’s constitutional rights flows from the fact that suspicionless 
warrant checks are not efficient from an arrest-maximizer’s perspective. 
But where an officer has reason to believe that a substantial number of 
people likely have outstanding warrants such that the hit rate of doing 
random warrant checks will be high, we should expect unconstitutional 
stops to occur.220 For these reasons, aggressive warrant enforcement is not 
likely to occur in neighborhoods where residents enjoy political and 
economic power. But in poor neighborhoods, outstanding warrants’ 
prevalence combined with their geographic concentration makes the 
likelihood of a “hit” higher. This point is developed next. 
2. Expanding Enforcement Discretion 
Characterizing warrant enforcement as “ministerial” touts the 
magisterial ideal at the cost of denying the discretion that non-compliance 
warrants affirmatively generate. That non-compliance warrants take the 
form of a “command” to police officers should not be taken at face 
value.221 They are no more a judicial command than the criminal law is a 
legislative command. Both “commands” generate pools of prospective 
arrestees. Law enforcement agencies and officers enjoy considerable 
discretion to select (and not select) from the pool. Scholars have long 
noted and criticized the broad discretion that police enjoy to enforce (or 
not enforce) criminal laws.222 Enforcement discretion raises the dangers 
of arbitrariness and opacity.223 The same dangers exist with regard to 
warrant enforcement. 
Scholars first took note of police discretion in the mid-twentieth 
century.224 The vast expanse of human conduct covered by criminal laws 
makes full enforcement impossible. That means that the police inevitably 
have choices to make about when to enforce those laws and when not to. 
Kenneth Culp Davis, one of the early legal scholars to critically engage 
the reality of police discretion, argued that these choices allowed 
                                                     
220. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Respondent’s Brief, supra note 
156, at 5–7. 
221. See supra note 130. 
222. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 99, 139 (1975). 
223. See id. at 99. 
224. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 6–7 (1993) (summarizing early research). 
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individual patrol officers to be “policy makers” for their beats.225 Davis 
noted that most police manuals, where they existed at all, included nothing 
about enforcement priorities.226 Taking cover under the rhetorical blanket 
of “full enforcement,” police department administrators deferred to 
patrolmen to decide when and against whom to enforce criminal laws.227 
The early scholars were particularly troubled by officers’ decisions not to 
enforce criminal laws because those choices were entirely invisible to 
supervisors.228 
Institutional choices are an even more significant determinant of 
enforcement outcomes than individual officers’ choices. As I have argued 
in previous work,229 choices with regard to which criminal laws to 
enforce, how intensively to enforce them, in which locations, and with 
which tactics are all policy questions within police departments’ 
discretion.230 Departments’ choices with regard to each of these questions 
have significant distributive consequences.231 For example, using arrest-
intensive enforcement tactics will likely generate more arrests than using 
high-visibility deterrence tactics.232 Electing to do arrest-intensive 
narcotics enforcement in a low-income minority community as opposed 
to a wealthier middle-class one will generate arrestees, defendants, and 
convicts that are correspondingly poor.233 The DOJ’s analysis of the 
Ferguson Police Department revealed a particularly insidious example of 
how institutional and individual officer discretion interact to produce 
unjust outcomes. The DOJ found that the Ferguson Police Department 
“communicated to officers that . . . they must focus on bringing in 
revenue.”234 Officers were required to meet specified citation quotas each 
month.235 The institutional emphasis on revenue generation led officers to 
engage in aggressive municipal and traffic code enforcement, issuing 
                                                     
225. DAVIS, supra note 222, at 99, 139. 
226. Id. at 33–37, 52. 
227. Id. at 52 (“[The] only open enforcement policy is one of full enforcement.”). 
228. Wayne R. LaFave, Police Rule-Making and the Fourth Amendment, in DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 211, 215 (Lloyd 
E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993) (characterizing early scholars’ concerns). Discretion 
increases in inverse relation to the seriousness of the relevant crime: officers can ignore traffic 
offenses as they like, but not homicides. 
229. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1172. 
230. Id. at 1186–91. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1206. 
233. Id. at 1199–2000. 
234. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 11.  
235. Id. at 12 (twenty-eight tickets per month).  
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citations for minor misconduct236—for example, traffic and pedestrian 
violations, disturbing the peace, and even failing to maintain one’s yard—
that were punished with unusually high fines.237 
Non-compliance warrants suggest that courts are enmeshed in a 
complex ecosystem in which they sometimes restrain and at other times 
affirmatively generate police enforcement discretion. Ferguson provides 
a disturbing example of the latter. The court, like the police, played a 
central role in generating revenue for the city. To that end, it aggressively 
levied fees and fines against those charged with minor municipal 
infractions, made it procedurally difficult to contest those infractions, and 
wantonly issued non-compliance warrants for failures to appear.238 The 
warrants also carried fees payable to the municipality that were separate 
and apart from those for the underlying infraction.239 
Just because non-compliance warrants are formally expressed as a 
“command” to police does not mean police understand them as such. The 
San Francisco Police Department, for example, permits its officers to 
forgo arrest in cases where an individual with an outstanding traffic 
warrant claims to have paid it.240 Officers are supposed to obtain 
supervisor approval first,241 but how that would be enforced is unclear. 
Just as with criminal law violations, outstanding warrants afford 
individual officers analogous “policy making” authority to that Davis 
wrote about in the 1970s.242 Officers’ acts of leniency in this context are 
no more visible to supervisors or the public than forgone opportunities to 
enforce criminal laws. One might imagine an officer directing a 
sympathetic suspect to “take care” of an unpaid traffic ticket rather than 
arresting the suspect on an outstanding warrant. That act of leniency is 
qualitatively no different than the officer letting a speeder go “with a 
warning” in the first instance. Such acts of leniency are sometimes 
publicly remarked upon, usually as laudatory examples of officers’ 
magnanimity.243 But few of those examples are likely brought to public 
light. 
                                                     
236. Id. at 4.  
237. Id. at 52.  
238. Id. at 42, 55. 
239. Id. 
240. S.F., Cal., Police Dep’t Gen. Order 6.18 II.A.1.b (July 27, 1994), https://sanfranciscopolice. 
org/sites/default/files/FileCenter/Documents/14754-DGO6.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9LM-JK3C]. 
241. Id. 
242. DAVIS, supra note 222, at 99, 139. 
243. See, e.g., Kate Irby, The Officer Could Have Taken Him to Jail, but Took Him to His Sister’s 
Funeral Instead, STAR-TELEGRAM (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.star-telegram.com/news/nation-
world/national/article104390156.html [https://perma.cc/GF3L-AZEY]. 
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As with criminal laws, departmental policy-making discretion in 
warrant enforcement has broader and deeper implications than any 
individual officers’ discretionary choices. Nor are departments 
particularly transparent about these choices, let alone their implications. 
As a threshold matter, it is a department’s willingness to invest in 
technological infrastructure and personnel that enables the possibility of 
remote warrant checks and enforcement at all. For officers to routinely 
conduct warrant checks, they must be able to remotely access a complete 
and well-organized store of information regarding outstanding warrants. 
Without both communication and data-storage technology, ascertaining 
whether a bench warrant exists for a person in the field would be time and 
resource-prohibitive. The Los Angeles Police Department, often at the 
forefront of technological innovation amongst large American police 
departments, embraced high-tech communication and data storage 
beginning in the 1950s.244 By the 1970s, warrant checks were a routine 
feature of traffic stops in at least some jurisdictions.245 Today, there are 
vast federal, state, and local databases cataloging information regarding 
outstanding warrants, the nature of the underlying offense, identifying 
information regarding the individual sought, and other information.246 
Officers in the field can often readily access those databases, particularly 
when their department has invested in patrol-vehicle computers.247 
Police departments also enjoy discretion with regard to populating 
federal, state, and local databases,248 signaling to its officers and other 
departments how seriously it takes any particular warrant. Whether they 
do so or not turns on discretionary use of personnel resources. Entering 
warrant data into databases is labor intensive, and there is no mechanism 
for ensuring which, if any, warrants an agency has entered.249 It is likely 
that many outstanding warrants are not entered in any database. For those 
                                                     
244. See MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 251 (Mike Davis & Michael Sprinkler eds., 1990); LeRoy 
McCabe & Leonard Farr, An Information System for Law Enforcement, 1966 AM. FED. INFO. 
PROCESSING SOC. 513, 515–18 (describing system design study for Los Angeles Police Department 
information system).  
245. See John A. Webster, Police Task and Time Study, 61 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE 
SCI. 94, 99 (1970) (noting possibility of remote warrant check during traffic stop). 
246. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Twenty-One 
Technical Experts and Legal Scholars in Support of Respondent at 11–12, Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373). 
247. See id.  
248. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 157, tbl.5a. 
249. See Lawrence Budd, Many Wanted Felons Go Free, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Sept. 8, 2012, 
12:00 AM), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/crime--law/many-wanted-felons-free/3A7pWp 
qam4WDWqzs3OHugP/ [https://perma.cc/NHJ4-E9UT]. 
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that are entered, law enforcement agencies are able to specify a “pick-up 
radius”—the geographic scope within which the agency will expend 
resources on collecting a wanted person.250 The pick-up radius reflects 
how seriously a department takes a particular category of warrants.251 
Some relatively minor offenses may have a county-only pick-up radius 
while serious offense may have a nationwide pick-up radius.252 There 
would be a legal basis for arresting someone on a warrant who was outside 
the pick-up area specified by the warrant-issuing jurisdiction, but the 
arresting agency would have to pay for transport. That is a discretionary 
act that an arresting agency is unlikely to undertake. 
As with the enforcement of substantive criminal laws, police 
departments enjoy considerable discretion with regard to warrant 
enforcement. Departmental choices regarding whether, where, and how 
criminal laws are to be enforced determine the volume and demographic 
profile of arrestees.253 The same holds true for warrant enforcement. Once 
the infrastructure is in place to allow for quick warrant checks from the 
field, departmental choices will determine how harshly or leniently 
individual officers will use warrant checks as an enforcement tactic. A 
department could very well decide not to make arrests for certain 
categories of warrants at all.254 The Minneapolis Police Department 
recently announced just such a policy decision.255 It has elected not to 
make arrests for outstanding warrants where the underlying offenses are 
minor—like traffic infractions.256 The choice was not one in favor of 
leniency for its own sake, but rather to make resources available for more 
serious crime control exigencies.257 This is the same rationale that a 
department might offer for forgoing arrests of low-level substantive 
criminal law offenses, like possession of small quantities of marijuana. 
                                                     
250. See Warrant Computer Entries, Prisoner Return and Extradition, in CINCINNATI POLICE 
DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE MANUAL 12.727 (2010), https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/depart 
ment-references/police-department-procedure-manual/ [https://perma.cc/X5GR-ZHQK]. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1186–90. 
254. See Procedure 503 – Obtaining and Executing Arrest Warrants, in SAN ANTONIO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT GENERAL MANUAL  503.05(B) (2014), https://www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/SA 
PD/GeneralManual/503ObtainingandExecutingArrestWarrants(10-03-14).pdf [https://perma.cc/9PB 
8-3G5N] (no arrest permitted for out-of-state misdemeanor warrant). 
255. Lou Raguse, MPD Not Arresting for Misdemeanor Bench Warrants, KARE 11 (July 20, 2016, 
11:55 PM), http://www.kare11.com/news/mpd-not-arresting-for-misdemeanor-bench-warrants/2782 
03637 [https://perma.cc/VS75-3CVK]. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
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A police department could just as easily exercise its warrant 
enforcement discretion harshly. For example, as described in the 
introduction, warrant enforcement has been a centerpiece of high-profile 
Detroit Police Department raids.258 While the raids were supposed to 
target at-large felons, most of the arrests were of individuals with 
outstanding traffic warrants.259 Quality-of-life policing in New York City 
presents a more far-ranging and systematic example. Warrant 
enforcement has featured prominently in the New York City Police 
Department’s quality-of-life campaign.260 As detailed at length by others, 
quality-of-life policing entailed aggressive policing against minor, so-
called broken windows crimes on the premise that doing so would create 
the impression of “order” and thereby deter more serious crimes.261 As 
part of the initiative, the New York Police Department incentivized patrol 
officers to issue more citations and make more arrests for a range of 
previously tolerated misconduct like drinking in public, aggressive 
panhandling, obstructing public sidewalks, and so on.262 Concomitantly, 
the department devoted resources to developing the infrastructure 
required for tracking the warrants issued against those who had FTAs for 
quality-of-life crimes.263 This was, in turn, supposed to enable officers in 
the field to more readily make arrests on such warrants.264 In other words, 
New York Police Department policy makers conceived of warrant 
enforcement and criminal law enforcement as coterminous features of the 
same harsh, arrest-intensive strategy for creating “order” on New York’s 
streets. 
The order maintenance example in New York City suggests the extent 
to which enforcement discretion generated by warrants and substantive 
criminal law can amplify one another. The most acute danger with 
discretionary authority is that it will be systematically exercised to the 
disadvantage of marginal groups. The next section demonstrates why 
warrants are more than just another law enforcement practice that 
incrementally contributes to criminal justice’s disproportionate impact on 
the poor and minorities. 
                                                     
258. Ryan Felton, Operation: Restore Public Relations, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/operation-restore-public-relations/Content?oid=2334953 
[https://perma.cc/E2UR-Q34Y]. 
259. Id. 
260. See Onishi, supra note 188. 
261. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1203–06. 
262. See Benjamin Weiser, New York City to Pay up to $75 Million over Dismissed Summonses, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/nyregion/new-york-city-agrees-
to-settlement-over-summonses-that-were-dismissed.html [https://perma.cc/QHX9-ZJRH]. 
263. See Onishi, supra note 188.  
264. See id.  
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3. Class, Race, and Arrest Feedback 
Aggressive warrant enforcement will create arrest feedback loops that 
amplify the demographic consequences of aggressive policing in poor, 
minority communities. Arrests for criminal law violations, non-
compliance warrants, and warrant enforcement are recursive, generating 
mutually reinforcing demographic and geographic effects over time. 
Arrests for substantive criminal law violations generate non-compliance 
warrants in the form of FTAs, alleged probation violations, and so on. 
Those warrants will, in turn, generate arrests. But they will also help 
identify new substantive criminal law violations as was true in Strieff. The 
outstanding warrant in that case allowed the officer to arrest Strieff and 
search him incident to arrest, revealing narcotics, which generated a new 
criminal law offense.265 A new cycle of non-compliance warrants and 
arrests could then ensue. Police agencies are likely to rely upon the 
demographic profile generated by this feedback loop to channel arrest-
intensive policing resources. Doing so contributes to the feedback and 
provides even greater rationale to continue the practices that sustain it. 
In any given jurisdiction that has a substantial poor population, criminal 
courts are likely to issue disproportionately greater numbers of non-
compliance warrants for poor defendants. In many of America’s largest 
jurisdictions, minorities inordinately constitute the ranks of the poor and 
the non-compliance warrants issued will reflect that demographic fact.266 
This will be true even if one assumes that there is proportionality in the 
number of well-to-do and poor defendants charged with criminal law 
violations and infractions at any given time—and as discussed in detail 
later on, that is an exceptionally unrealistic assumption. The poor are less 
likely to comply with the kinds of conditions that trigger warrants, 
particularly those that require payment. Even making appearances in court 
is more difficult for the poor, who tend to have marginal employment that 
affords little flexibility to take time off work.267 This makes appearing for 
court dates more difficult than for those who have more stable 
employment.268 Once a warrant has issued, those with unstable 
                                                     
265. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016). 
266. See Elizabeth Kneebone & Richard V. Reeves, The Intersection of Race, Place, and 
Multidimensional Poverty, BROOKINGS (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-
intersection-of-race-place-and-multidimensional-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/JAM5-AG49]. 
267. See, e.g., DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 48. 
268. See id.  
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employment stand a greater risk of losing their jobs if incarcerated, even 
for relatively short periods of time.269 
The fear of incarceration may, ironically, lead the poor to be less likely 
to deal with outstanding warrants.270 This will be most true for non-
compliance warrants that are for failures to pay.271 Traffic and low-level 
criminal offenses are typically punished with fines. Similarly, paying fees 
and fines is often a condition of probation.272 Other probation conditions, 
such as complying with treatment and counseling obligations, also may 
require making payment. And of course, warrants for failing to pay child 
support are almost exclusively leveled against poor men.273 When 
financial obligations like these go unpaid—or one fails to appear for a 
court hearing involving such a financial obligation—a bench warrant will 
often issue.274 Despite the constitutional requirement that courts level no 
greater fee or fine than a defendant can actually pay, poor violators may 
be afraid to appear in court because they fear being jailed for their inability 
to comply.275 
Court rules and processes also can play a significant role in ensuring 
that the poor are more likely to be warranted than those with means. These 
processes often ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable defendants 
are unable to comply with court-ordered conditions, including the 
obligation to appear for court proceedings. The DOJ’s Ferguson report 
details a stark example.276 The court liberally issued warrants for 
defendants charged with minor crime and citations, doing so at a 
disproportionately high rate for minority defendants.277 The court required 
in-person appearances for most municipal offenses. That requirement 
                                                     
269. See Alice Goffman, On the Run: Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 
339, 354 (2009). 
270. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 47–49 (documenting belief amongst those 
unable to pay fine that appearing in court will result in immediate arrest); Daniel M. Flannery & Jeff 
M. Kretschmar, Fugitive Safe Surrender, 11 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 437, 451 (2012). 
271.  DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 47–49. 
272. See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 
104 GEO. L.J. 291, 314 (2016). 
273. See Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, supra note 137, at 193–96.  
274. In theory, it is unconstitutional to jail a defendant for failing to pay a fee or fine that she is too 
poor to pay. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S 660 (1985). But, when the issue is raised at all, the “ability 
to pay” is a question of fact that judges have discretion to decide. In contexts like child support, judges 
have been known to impose financial obligations based upon fanciful projections of the potential 
earnings that a low-skilled, poor father might earn. See Sekhon, Punitive Injunctions, supra note 137, 
at 196.  
275. See Flannery & Kretschmar, supra note 270, at 451. 
276. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19. 
277. See id. at 68. 
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increased the likelihood that defendants would fail to appear—particularly 
those who worried about paying the high fines and those with inflexible 
work schedules. Compounding the appearance requirement, the DOJ 
found that the court did not provide information to defendants regarding 
their rights, the charges against them, or even the correct date or time of 
their hearing.278 Ironically, full payment was required as a precondition 
for quashing any warrant, however egregiously unlawful its issuance.279 
Ferguson may be an extreme example, but it is likely different from 
other jurisdictions in quantity, not kind. Fees and fines are heaped upon 
poor defendants in many jurisdictions with similar consequences to those 
observed in Ferguson.280 Many jurisdictions, for example, rely upon 
private contractors to provide probation services for misdemeanors and 
traffic violations.281 The private probation companies generate revenue by 
charging probationers a supervisory fee.282 Company employees are, in 
turn, rewarded for maximizing revenue.283 This leads to aggressive use of 
revocation and the concomitant issuing of non-compliance warrants.284 
This “aggressive collection agency” approach to collecting fines and fees 
impacts poor defendants most severely.285 
The discussion thus far has assumed that police arrest the poor and the 
privileged proportionally for new criminal law and traffic violations. That, 
of course, is completely untrue. Police enforcement is usually directed 
more aggressively against poor and minority communities.286 At any 
given time, in most large urban jurisdictions in the United States, the 
majority of defendants who are forced into the criminal justice machinery 
                                                     
278. Id. at 51–52.  
279. See id. at 47.  
280. See Profiting from Probation: America’s “Offender-Funded” Probation Industry, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/05/profiting-probation/americas-offend 
er-funded-probation-industry [https://perma.cc/J59A-APTY] (describing fees imposed by private 
probation companies in Georgia) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH]. 
281. See Sarah Doisca Bellacicco, Safe Haven No Longer: The Role of Georgia Courts and Private 
Probation Companies in Sustaining a De Facto Debtors’ Prison System, 48 GA. L. REV. 227, 245 
(2014). 
282. See id. 
283. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 280, at 51. 
284. S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROFITING FROM THE POOR: A REPORT ON PREDATORY 
PROBATION COMPANIES IN GEORGIA 8 (2008) [hereinafter S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS]; see also 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 280, at 51 (124,788 warrants issued in 2012 in Georgia for 
individuals on private probation). Some probation companies allow supervisors, who are rewarded 
for generating revenue, to shed non-paying probationers from their caseload as an incentive. Id. 
285. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 52–54; S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra 
note 284, at 8. 
286. See Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, supra note 184, at 1199–200. 
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are low-income minorities.287 Calls for police service may be higher in 
low-income communities than other communities. The police might also 
elect to use aggressive arrest and citation-intensive enforcement tactics in 
poor neighborhoods as part of a broken windows campaign as occurred in 
New York City or narcotics suppression as has occurred in any number of 
cities.288 A city like Ferguson, motivated by revenue incentives, might 
focus police resources in poor neighborhoods because there are more 
readily visible code violations that can be ticketed there or because 
residents are less likely to challenge the citations.289 Similar logic might 
impel a highway patrol division to target a crime like license tag renewal 
violation, which is more frequently committed by low-income 
motorists.290 
Because there are proportionally more “minority inputs” into the 
criminal justice machinery for new criminal law and traffic violations, that 
will contribute to their proportionally greater failures to appear, failures 
to pay, and failures to comply with probation conditions.291 Non-
compliance warrants are a by-product of aggressive criminal law 
enforcement. But substantive criminal law violations are also a by-product 
of aggressive warrant enforcement. An outstanding non-compliance 
warrant not only creates a basis for making an arrest but is a vehicle for 
identifying new criminal law violations. Once police make an arrest 
pursuant to an outstanding warrant, the Fourth Amendment permits a 
search incident to arrest, which will sometimes yield evidence of a new 
crime; in Strieff, it was narcotics evidence.292 The Supreme Court held that 
such evidence is admissible in a new criminal case, even if the stop that 
allowed for discovery of the outstanding warrant was unconstitutional.293 
                                                     
287. See, e.g., DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 65–66 (minorities arrested at higher rate 
for violations than Whites). 
288. See supra notes 258–64 and discussion; Adrienne L. Meiring, Walking the Constitutional 
Beat: Fourth Amendment Implications of Police Use of Saturation Patrols and Roadblocks, 54 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 497, 500 (1993) (describing twined use of warrant checks and stop and frisk as part of 
“saturation patrol” strategy in various cities). 
289. See supra notes 258–64 and discussion. 
290. Cf. Sharon LaFreniere & Andrew Lehern, Disproportionate Risks of Driving While Black, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-
driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/A9HL-C3DA] (discussing racial disparity in traffic stops in 
North Carolina).  
291. Cf. John S. Goldkamp & E. Vîlcicã, Targeted Enforcement and Adverse System Side Effects: 
The Generation of Fugitives in Philadelphia, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 371, 374 (2008). 
292. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016). 
293. Id. 
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This sort of dynamic, however, has the potential to shape police 
enforcement policy more broadly. 
For any jurisdiction that has a substantial poor minority population, 
arrest feedback may create what Bernard Harcourt has called a “ratchet 
effect.”294 A ratchet effect occurs when police use the demographic profile 
of an incarcerated population to predict the identities of future offenders 
and direct enforcement resources accordingly.295 In the context of warrant 
enforcement, police might use demographic and geographic information 
on the prevalence of outstanding warrants—or their perceptions of 
demographic and geographic prevalence—to structure how enforcement 
resources are distributed. More outstanding warrants for minority suspects 
will support more arrest-intensive policing in minority neighborhoods. In 
turn, that will generate more arrests for substantive criminal law violations 
and more warrants. Over time, this will lead to an increasingly 
concentrated minority demographic in a jurisdiction’s criminal justice 
machinery. Judges are probably less likely to set affordable bail for those 
defendants who have, or have had, a warrant for an FTA. In-custody 
defendants are more likely to plead guilty than out-of-custody defendants. 
These dynamics are likely to fuel perceptions among the police of 
disproportionate minority criminality. That is to say that compliance 
warrants’ enforcement effects will generate their own, self-supporting 
demographic rationale. 
Arrest feedback helps explain why outstanding warrants figure 
prominently in the experience of young men of color in America’s cities. 
Although that experience is not the subject of sustained sociological 
treatment, recent urban ethnography suggests that just the perception of 
having an outstanding warrant constrains a person’s quotidian life 
choices, like applying for a job, to monumental ones, like being present 
for the birth of a child.296 As discussed, an outstanding warrant functions 
as a “red flag,”297 leaving many in poor minority communities to navigate 
life with the belief that the State’s punitive eye is trained upon them. They 
may not even be aware of the warrant’s precise nature.298 For the young 
men of color who constitute America’s urban underclass, the perception 
of having “caught a warrant” amplifies the sense of vulnerability to arrest 
                                                     
294. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN 
ACTUARIAL AGE 145 (2005). 
295. Id. at 152–54.  
296. See Goffman, supra note 269, at 343–45, 351–52, 354. 
297. See supra notes 147–48 and discussion. 
298. See Flannery & Kretschmar, supra note 270, at 449 (finding that one in three warrant study 
participants was unaware of the nature of outstanding warrant). 
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and incarceration. That sense leads many to curtail encounters not just 
with the police, but with public actors who are thought to have a 
connection to the police like hospitals and courts.299 That is to live a 
cramped existence at best. It may even lead to deadly consequences if, for 
example, the belief that one has an outstanding warrant prompts someone 
to run from a police officer who then shoots.300 
III. REGULATING NON-COMPLIANCE WARRANTS 
Section II demonstrated that non-compliance warrants generate both 
constitutional and extra-constitutional harms. As a preliminary matter, 
federal, state, and local governments should systematically collect data on 
the number of outstanding warrants, the bases for those warrants, the 
number of arrests that are warrant-based, and the demographic profile of 
the individuals sought and arrested. As is true in other areas of criminal 
justice,301 the paucity of data makes it difficult to evaluate judicial and 
police practices, let alone reform them. The analysis in Part II also 
counsels in favor of substantive reform at the federal, state, and local 
levels. 
First, the Supreme Court should create a meaningful remedy for the 
constitutional harms non-compliance warrants encourage. This requires 
substantial revision of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: mainly, it 
demands that some version of an exclusionary remedy be available for 
wrongfully seized persons. Such dramatic reworking of doctrine is not 
imminent. Thankfully, there is considerable room for state and local 
reform. Local courts and police generate and enforce the overwhelming 
majority of outstanding non-compliance warrants. Accordingly, those 
agencies are well positioned to ameliorate the problems created by non-
compliance warrants. 
A. Excluding the Person 
The Supreme Court decided Utah v. Strieff incorrectly for the reasons 
identified by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.302 But section II.B.1 
demonstrated that Strieff only marginally contributes to the already 
powerful incentives that police have to conduct unconstitutional warrant 
                                                     
299. See Goffman, supra note 269, at 343–45, 351–52, 354. 
300. See supra note 193. 
301. See, e.g., Nirej Sekhon, Blue on Black: An Empirical Assessment of Police Shootings, 54 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 189, 193 (2016) [hereinafter Sekhon, Blue on Black] (noting paucity of data regarding 
police shootings). 
302. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–74 (2016). 
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checks. Excluding evidence seized incident to arrest would not likely alter 
those incentives so profoundly. If police are to be deterred from carrying 
out unconstitutional warrant checks, defendants must have an immediate 
remedy in their criminal case for the unconstitutional seizure.303 
The Court should provide some form of the exclusionary remedy for 
unconstitutional seizures like that which occurred in Strieff. The remedy 
should not depend upon whether police happen to discover additional 
evidence of wrongdoing following a search incident to arrest. In many 
cases, this would mean releasing defendants from custody and allowing 
them to run notwithstanding valid warrants for their arrest. 
Frisbie-Ker is the greatest obstacle to making some version of the 
exclusionary remedy available to those subject to unconstitutional warrant 
checks. Frisbie-Ker forbids a court from dismissing an indictment based 
on law enforcement having unlawfully obtained the defendant’s 
presence.304 Frisbie-Ker, which developed in the context of extradition 
cases, makes sense where the magisterial ideal is borne out, whether in 
the context of extradition or warrants. Where the State has gone to the 
trouble of obtaining judicial approval for an enforcement action and 
commits a procedural error in its execution, the defendant should not 
receive the windfall of dismissal. Frisbie-Ker rejected just such a 
“sporting theory” of criminal procedure. But the rejection is profoundly 
out of tune with the account of non-compliance warrants provided in this 
Article. 
Non-compliance warrants and their enforcement reflect the extent to 
which criminal justice actually has become sport. When Justice Holmes 
quipped that criminal enforcement is not a “fox hunt,”305 he could not have 
anticipated that a government would reward police, prosecutors, and 
judges for racking up high scores in a relentless competition to produce 
revenue.306 In Ferguson, issuing non-compliance warrants was just a 
strategic move in the broader revenue scheme. The warrants bore no 
relation to criminal prosecution’s traditional ends: punishing or deterring 
crime. Enforcing the warrants amounted to playing the odds in 
neighborhoods where the “hit rate” is likely to be high.307 There were no 
“points” to be had by upholding the Constitution.308 
                                                     
303. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (right to be free of unconstitutional search is an 
“empty promise” without exclusionary remedy). 
304. See supra section II.C.1. 
305. See supra note 216 and accompanying discussion. 
306. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 10 (noting that police officers were more 
concerned with generating revenue than public safety or welfare). 
307. See supra section II.C.3. 
308. See supra section II.C.1.  
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Denying an exclusionary remedy to unconstitutionally seized 
defendants is not to abjure a sporting theory of criminal procedure, but 
rather to embrace one whose rules are stacked against defendants. Where 
a defendant is unconstitutionally stopped and arrested on an outstanding 
warrant for a minor traffic violation, being released is no windfall. Doing 
so simply denies the state the ill-gotten gains of its unconstitutional 
conduct. This is entirely consistent with the traditional understanding of 
how the exclusionary rule is supposed to deter police officers from 
engaging in unconstitutional misconduct.309 But extending the 
exclusionary remedy to unconstitutional seizures in this way would raise 
procedural difficulties separate and apart from Frisbie-Ker. 
First, courts would have to construct a typology of warrants that 
distinguishes between those which could be the basis for exclusion and 
those which could not. An unconstitutional seizure should, in other words, 
compel release in some cases, but not others.310 As suggested by the 
example above, the case for release is strongest with regard to non-
compliance warrants for outstanding traffic infractions.311 In these cases, 
courts would have to develop rules specifying some amount of time 
during which the police would be barred from re-serving the warrant. This 
would prevent the exclusionary remedy from collapsing into risible 
formalism: a judge sets a defendant free just for the few moments it takes 
the sheriff to re-arrest based on the valid warrant.312 
In contrast to traffic infractions are serious felonies involving harm to 
others. The logic of Frisbie-Ker is most convincing in cases where an 
investigatory warrant is outstanding in connection with a serious case like 
this. A sporting theory of criminal procedure is least satisfactory in this 
context. Letting a suspected murderer free for an unconstitutional warrant 
check defies any ordinary conception of justice. The cost-benefit analysis 
                                                     
309. See Stuntz, supra note 74, at 895–96. 
310. This will not sit comfortably with the Court’s insistence that the Fourth Amendment is trans-
substantive and applies in exactly the same way regardless of the underlying criminal offense at issue. 
William Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 842, 870 (2001). The simple rejoinder is that the proposal here does not implicate substantive 
Fourth Amendment principles, but only whether the exclusionary rule is available—an inquiry that 
requires cost-benefit analysis. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2051, 2061 (2016) (citing 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).  
311. In traffic cases and other comparably minor criminal cases, quashing the warrant and 
dismissing the underlying case would seem fair. Such a remedy would be appropriate if the 
jurisdiction considering exclusion were the very one that had issued the warrant. But that would not 
always be the case. If an individual were unconstitutionally seized by the police in a jurisdiction other 
than that which issued the warrant, the court considering exclusion would not have authority to quash 
the outstanding warrant or dismiss the underlying case.  
312. See Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U.S. 6, 13 (1916). 
Sekhon – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2018  9:38 PM 
2018] DANGEROUS WARRANTS 1011 
 
that exclusionary rule jurisprudence calls for313 clearly would not weigh 
in favor of release in such a case. There is, of course, a vast swath of cases 
between the traffic FTA and the wanted murder suspect. Courts would 
have to decide how to treat warrants stemming from these intermediate 
cases over time, and principles would accordingly develop. 
Second, there would have to be an opportunity to litigate the Fourth 
Amendment violation soon after arrest. Suppression is typically litigated 
in advance of trial. But for those who are unconstitutionally seized and 
subsequently held on an outstanding warrant, trial may be too late for 
exclusion to be useful. Defendants should have an opportunity to litigate 
exclusion in the immediate wake of arrest. While someone held pursuant 
to a warrant is not constitutionally entitled to a Gerstein hearing,314 some 
functional equivalent is necessary in order to guarantee that exclusion is 
of practical use. This, however, raises a third and less tractable problem. 
The evidentiary contest over the stop’s constitutionality will pit officer 
testimony against the defendant’s testimony, and officers are likely to 
have the upper hand.315 Officers are permitted to approach citizens and 
ask them to consensually share identifying information, which would 
provide a sufficient basis for a lawful warrant check.316 In the absence of 
consent, officers are permitted to seize an individual and conduct a brief 
investigative interview if there is “reasonable suspicion” to think that the 
individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.317 Officers can 
obtain identifying information as part of such an interview.318 Depending 
on the neighborhood, a “bulge [at the] waistband,” “‘furtive’ movements,” 
or holding eye contact may be sufficient to constitute “reasonable 
suspicion.”319 It is easy for an officer to manufacture such facts following 
what, in fact, was an unconstitutional stop. This, of course, is a species of 
“testilying.”320 Whenever resolution of Fourth Amendment questions 
turns on a contested issue of fact regarding the basis for the stop, officers 
will have opportunity for strategic re-telling of the facts. And defendants, 
                                                     
313. See id. 
314. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1974). 
315. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 COLO. L. 
REV. 1037, 1041–45 (1996). 
316. See Michael Kimberly, Discovering Arrest Warrants: Intervening Police Conduct and 
Foreseeability, 118 YALE L.J. 177, 179 (2008) (describing practice). 
317. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)). 
318. See Hiibel v. Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 187–88 (2004) (holding Fourth Amendment permits state 
to compel suspect to disclose name in a lawful Terry stop). 
319. See Sekhon, Blue on Black, supra note 301, at 198 (describing incident reports prepared by 
Chicago police). 
320. See Slobogin, supra note 315, at 1041–45. 
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particularly if it is just their word, are left in the awkward and untenable 
position of persuading judges that officers lied on the stand. This 
evidentiary problem is endemic in Fourth Amendment litigation and 
should not prevent the creation of a remedy for unconstitutional seizures. 
Even if making exclusion available for seizures is largely symbolic, 
that symbolism is superior to the status quo, where there is no remedy at 
all. The absence of a remedy signals to police agencies and officers that 
the practice is permissible.321 Symbolically underscoring the 
impermissibility of unconstitutional conduct is important, even if not 
actionable in every case of a violation. And, of course, there will be some 
cases in which, for whatever reason, it is factually clear that police did 
conduct an unconstitutional stop before discovering a valid non-
compliance warrant. Strieff is an example of just such a case. It is unclear 
why there should not be a remedy in such cases, just as there is when 
physical evidence is unconstitutionally discovered or seized. The Court 
itself elliptically recognizes the awkwardness of this disjuncture in Strieff. 
In Strieff, the Court indicated that it might be appropriate for courts to 
exclude physical evidence seized incident to arrest if a defendant can show 
that police regularly and systematically make unconstitutional seizures in 
order to do warrant checks.322 Practically speaking, it will be difficult for 
most criminal defendants to marshal the evidence required to successfully 
demonstrate a pattern and practice of unconstitutional policing. I have 
argued elsewhere that public defenders in particular should take up the 
Court’s challenge, beginning by systematically tracking clients’ reports of 
police misconduct.323 In the meantime, however, there is little leverage for 
challenging unconstitutional seizures where a valid warrant is discovered. 
Thankfully, the possibility of meaningful local reform does not turn on 
constitutional principles. 
B. Embracing the Magisterial Ideal 
Local police and state courts bear most of the responsibility for the 
problems described in this Article. Accordingly, they are well situated to 
contain those problems. 
                                                     
321. Of course, a civil remedy is theoretically available for violating the constitutional right, but 
the impediments to obtaining such a remedy make it impractical for the vast majority of those subject 
to a brief, unconstitutional warrant check. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 65, at 337–41.  
322. Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2015, 2064 (2016). 
323. See Nirej Sekhon, Mass Suppression: Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, 51 GA. L. 
REV. 429, 474 (2017). 
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Local police departments can use their considerable discretion to 
decline to enforce non-compliance warrants.324 As discussed above, the 
Minneapolis Police Department adopted such a policy.325 A department 
might, for example, issue a blanket policy that forbids officers from 
making stops based solely upon non-compliance warrants for traffic-
related matters. Should record of such a warrant arise in the course of an 
otherwise lawful stop, officers should warn the citizen but should not 
arrest on the warrant alone. To discourage officers from making 
unconstitutional stops to carry out warrant checks, a department might 
refuse to process arrests that are based on such warrants alone. Many 
police departments will hesitate to restrain officer discretion in this way 
for the reasons suggested by the analysis in Part II. Even if a department 
were to nominally embrace such a policy, it might not apply the policy 
vigorously if at all. Police departments are notoriously opaque with regard 
to policymaking and implementation. For that and other reasons, police 
self-regulation has not been particularly effective—at least from a civil 
rights standpoint—in other contexts, and there is little reason to think that 
it would be different here. Judicial regulation is more promising. 
State and local courts should embrace the magisterial ideal. As detailed 
in Part I, this requires that they seriously consider a defendant’s interests 
and balance them against the government’s interests before issuing a 
warrant. Reconciling the magisterial ideal with the realities of mass justice 
will be tricky. Criminal court judges will, for example, face countless 
cases for low-level crimes and infractions in which defendants fail to 
appear. In the absence of the defendant or any meaningful information 
about the defendant, it will be difficult for a judge to be circumspect in 
the way that the magisterial ideal presupposes. As a bare minimum, judges 
should resist issuing warrants in a thoughtlessly mechanical way. A non-
compliance warrant should not be a rote, default action. Non-compliance 
warrants all too easily become just that in low-level cases because the 
stakes in any particular case are low, and there is little legal or 
bureaucratic resistance to issuing a warrant. As this Article has 
endeavored to show, however, this practice has harmful consequences in 
the aggregate. 
Courts’ efforts to rein in non-compliance warrants will be greatly aided 
in jurisdictions where the executive and legislative branches are 
committed to reforming their practices with regard to low-level offenses. 
For example, New York City has been reconsidering its commitment to 
                                                     
324. See supra section II.C.2. 
325. See supra notes 255–57 and discussion. 
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quality-of-life policing for many years. The city recently announced that 
it would curtail its reliance on the desk summons that have generated over 
a million outstanding warrants for FTAs.326 But even in the absence of 
such political commitment, local courts have considerable power to 
control non-compliance warrants’ issuance. 
The magisterial ideal suggests that warrants ought to issue as a matter 
of last resort after a judge has painstakingly reviewed a particular 
defendant’s individual circumstances. As a practical matter, that will not 
be possible in most mass justice courts for obvious reasons: there are too 
many cases and too little information readily available about a (typically, 
absent) defendant’s circumstances. Thus, the local judiciary should not 
leave it to individual judges to satisfy the magisterial ideal in individual 
cases. Instead, courts should address non-compliance warrants as a matter 
of institutional policy and craft default principles that attempt to 
approximate the magisterial ideal. 
Basic, starting principles that courts might work from in devising 
policy include the following: 
(1) Courts should clearly state that non-compliance warrants are a last 
resort where a non-compliant defendant threatens the orderly dispensation 
of justice, not the first line of administrative recourse. 
(2) Courts should identify procedural requirements that unnecessarily 
generate FTAs such as requiring in-person appearance for infractions and 
motions practice in criminal cases. As discussed above, FTAs constitute 
a substantial portion of non-compliance warrants.327 Limiting the 
circumstances in which an individual defendant need appear in court will 
correspondingly limit the opportunities for FTAs to issue.328 For 
defendants who are represented, courts might waive personal appearance 
for all hearings save those where the defendant’s appearance is absolutely 
necessary—for example, trial or a suppression motion in which she plans 
to testify. For unrepresented parties—including those charged with traffic 
offenses—courts might use technological solutions to permit defendants 
to appear virtually when they would like to contest a citation or make a 
showing that they are unable to pay. 
(3) Courts might create blanket policies not to issue non-compliance 
warrants for specific categories of offenses. For example, non-compliance 
warrants may be gratuitous if state law creates an alternative, less intrusive 
                                                     
326. See Schwirtz, supra note 166. 
327. See supra note 193. 
328. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 48 (noting Ferguson court’s requirement that 
defendants appear in person for broader range of infractions and offenses than required under state 
law). 
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mechanism for ensuring the vindication of the underlying infraction. For 
example, in many states, outstanding traffic tickets must be paid before a 
driver can renew her license.329 When such a mechanism exists for an 
offense, courts might consider eliminating non-compliance warrants 
altogether. 
(4) Courts might create blanket policies not to issue non-compliance 
warrants for specific categories of alleged offenders. For example, 
someone who has no history of FTAs should receive the benefit of the 
doubt should that individual fail to appear for a court date or allegedly fail 
to satisfy a probation condition. For such an alleged offender, the court’s 
default action might be to reschedule hearings and re-send notice to the 
last known address. 
Courts should also create administrative policies that aim to minimize 
the harms generated by non-compliance warrants. Again, such policies 
should be conceived through the lens of the magisterial ideal, with 
sensitivity to local circumstances. Some rough principles from which such 
policies might evolve include the following: 
(1) Do not allow court clerks to issue non-compliance warrants. The 
magisterial ideal presupposes that a neutral magistrate exercise judgment 
before a warrant issues. Even if the moment of “neutral decision making” 
is not exalted in the way that Supreme Court jurisprudence would 
presuppose, the symbolic significance of a judge issuing warrants should 
not be entirely set aside. Allowing non-judicial staff to issue warrants also 
increases the risk of non-compliance warrants becoming a bureaucratic 
default action. 
(2) Allow court clerks to quash warrants issued for FTAs within some 
clearly specified time after the warrant has issued. Court clerks have a 
significant role to play in the management of non-compliance warrants. 
Individuals who have outstanding warrants should be incentivized to have 
those warrants quashed so that they do not remain outstanding 
indefinitely. That might be accomplished by announcing clear rules about 
how and when warrants may be quashed by a clerk. Allowing for an 
administrative employee to quickly quash a warrant should make the 
process less intimidating than having to appear before a judge. Clear rules 
as to how and when warrants may be quashed administratively will also 
serve to put individuals at ease that they will not be summarily arrested if 
they visit the courthouse with an outstanding warrant.330 
(3) Make it easy for individuals to ascertain whether there is an 
outstanding warrant for their arrest. As suggested by the discussion in Part 
                                                     
329. See Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 16–17, 16 n.64. 
330. See DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 19, at 4, 47–49. 
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II, non-compliance warrants are often issued and entered into databases 
unbeknownst to the named individuals. Among certain communities, this 
can create pervasive anxiety and mistrust of police and other public 
institutions.331 Courts might use technology to create a non-threatening 
mechanism for individuals to ascertain whether there is actually an 
outstanding warrant for their arrest and on what grounds. The same system 
ought to be used to apprise defendants of whether quashing the warrant is 
administratively possible and what steps might be taken to accomplish 
that end. Courts should assemble such systems carefully to ensure that 
defendants’ privacy interests are not compromised—for example, by 
making their warrant status readily accessible to everyone. 
(4) Organize periodic amnesties for certain categories of outstanding 
warrants. This is particularly viable for warrants that are based on some 
failure to comply with a financial obligation to the state.332 
 A particular court might experiment with these and other proposals for 
reducing the number of non-compliance warrants that are issued at any 
given time. Far more important than embracing any particular proposal is 
for jurisdictions to engage the non-compliance warrants issuance as an 
important policy question. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s account of non-compliance warrants calls not only the 
Fourth Amendment’s “warrant preference” into question, but also the 
courts’ efficacy as police regulators. Courts do not have a command and 
control relationship with the police. Courts both limit and generate police 
discretion. This dynamic plays out not in the course of any one case but 
over the life cycles of a multitude of cases. No single non-compliance 
warrant generates incentives for the police to violate the Constitution or 
measurably exacerbates the class and racial disparities that have become 
endemic in criminal justice. That is likely what makes it easy for judges 
to issue non-compliance warrants as a thoughtless, administrative act in 
one case after another. It is in the aggregate that these warrants amplify 
police discretion for the worse. If courts are to ameliorate the harms non-
compliance warrants create, they must first recognize themselves as 
policy makers, not just arbiters of individual cases. 
                                                     
331. See Goffman, supra note 269, at 343–44, 351–52, 354.  
332. The city of Decatur, Georgia, for example, recently announced such an amnesty. See 2017 
Amnesty Program, CITY OF DECATUR, http://www.decaturga.com/city-government/city-departments/ 
municipal-court/2016-amnesty-program [https://perma.cc/J2L7-83J6]. 
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Utah v. Strieff is a poor decision, not least because its reasoning is 
unpersuasive. More troublesome is the Court’s continuing commitment to 
withdrawing the Fourth Amendment from playing a role in regulating the 
racial and class consequences of policing in the United States.333 State and 
local courts should not take their cues from this opinion. With or without 
Strieff, state and local courts are best positioned to craft solutions for the 
harms non-compliance warrants create. These courts should not forsake 
that opportunity just because the Supreme Court has given them 
permission to do so. 
 
                                                     
333. See Utah v. Strieff, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2051, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
